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Abstract
This final project touches on two topics in machine learning that are somehow related to games,
but that are actually loosely related to each other.
The first part of the thesis, which is the second one chronologically, is composed by Chapters 1,
2, 3 and Appendices A, B. Chapter 1 is a review a concepts and algorithms for differentiable
n-player games. Chapter 2 and Appendix A consist of original work and show local convergence
results for some of the algorithms discussed in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 (and Appendix B) contain
a preliminary version of the article that we will submit to NeurIPS 2019 in May 2019. We
provide global convergence guarantees (under certain assumptions) for a variant of the extra-
gradient method that introduces stochasticity on the players. The article will also contain an
experimental part, but is not included in this thesis. My coauthors for the work in Chapter 3
are Samy Jelassi, Arthur Mensch, Damien Scieur and Joan Bruna.
The second part of the thesis is composed by Chapter 4 and Appendix C. It is original work
as well. Two planning methods that leverage the arithmetic structure of the environments are
presented, together with experimental results. My coauthors for this part are David Folque´,
Sainbayar Sukhbaatar, Arthur Szlam and Joan Bruna. This work was submitted unsuccessfully
to ICML 2019 in January 2019.
Keywords: n-player differentiable games, Nash equilibria, extra-gradient method, planning in
structured environments, reinforcement learning.
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Chapter 1
Differentiable n-Player Games
1.1 Framework
Definition 1.1. We define an n-player differentiable game to be the tuple (n, x1, ..., xn, `1, ..., `n),
where for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi ⊆ Rdi and `i : X1 × · · · ×Xn → R is twice differentiable.
We can express all the parameters of the game as
x = (x(1), x(2), ..., x(n)) ∈ X := X1 × · · · ×Xn ⊆ Rd (1.1)
Here, d =
∑n
i=1 di. The interpretation of the definition is that each player i has a loss function
`i : X → R which has as input the vector of parameters x. As in any game theoretic setting,
the player seeks to achieve the minimum value of `i possible but is only able to control x
(i). We
will write x = (x(i), x(−i)), where x(−i) refers to all the parameters different from x(i).
Definition 1.2. We define the simultaneous gradient
F (x) =

∇1`1(x)
∇2`2(x)
...
∇n`n(x)
 (1.2)
We can write the Jacobian of the simultaneous gradient JF as
JF (x) =

∇11`1(x) ∇12`1(x) · · · ∇1n`1(x)
∇21`2(x) ∇22`2(x) · · · ∇2n`2(x)
...
...
. . .
...
∇n1`n(x) ∇n2`n(x) · · · ∇nn`n(x)
 (1.3)
1
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The Jacobian of the simultaneous gradient is also commonly known as the Hessian of the game,
although it is not the Hessian of any function in general.
Example 1.1. Let x(1), x(2) ∈ R3. We can define a two player game with losses:
`1(x
(1), x(2)) =
[
x
(1)
1 x
(1)
2 x
(1)
3
]
0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0


x
(2)
1
x
(2)
2
x
(2)
3

`2(x
(1), x(2)) = −`1(x(1), x(2)) =
[
x
(2)
1 x
(2)
2 x
(2)
3
]
0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0


x
(1)
1
x
(1)
2
x
(1)
3

This game is a bimatrix game. We can compute
∇1`1 =

0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0


x
(2)
1
x
(2)
2
x
(2)
3

∇2`2 =

0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0


x
(1)
1
x
(1)
2
x
(1)
3

JF =
[
∇11`1 ∇12`1
∇21`2 ∇22`2
]
=

0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 −1 0 1
0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0 0

1.1.1 Solution concepts
The most common solution concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium. In our framework,
Definition 1.3. A pure Nash equilibrium is a vector x? such that for all i and all x˜
(i) ∈ Xi,
`i(x
(i)
? , x
(−i)
? ) ≤ `i(x˜(i), x(−i)? ).
A related concept is that of a local pure Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.4. x? is a local pure Nash equilibrium if for all i there exists a neighborhood
Ui ⊆ Xi of x(i)? such that for all x˜(i) ∈ Xi, `i(x(i)? , x(−i)? ) ≤ `i(x˜(i), x(−i)? ).
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Pure Nash equilibria are obviously local pure Nash equilibria. In an analogy with global and
local minima, the advantage of local Nash equilibria is that they correspond to certain conditions
on the first and second derivatives of the loss functions. Specifically,
Lemma 1.5. The following hold for any n-player differentiable game:
(a) F (x?) = 0 is a necessary condition for x? to be a local Nash equilibrium.
(b) ∀i st 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∇ii`i(x?)  0 is a necessary condition for x? to be a local Nash equilibrium.
(c) F (x?) = 0 together with ∀i st 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∇11`1(x?)  0 is a sufficient condition for x? to
be a local Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It follows from sufficient and necessary conditions on the Hessian for local minima.
Definition 1.6. xˆ is a fixed point if F (xˆ) = 0.
Definition 1.7. A general matrix M is positive semidefinite if x>Mx ≥ 0 for all x 6= 0.
Equivalently, M is positive semidefinite if and only if its symmetric part M+M
>
2 is positive
definite.
Definition 1.8. A stable fixed point xˆ is a fixed point such that H(xˆ) is positive semidefinite.
Lemma 1.9. If JF (xˆ) is positive semidefinite, then all the diagonal blocks ∇ii`i(xˆ) of H are
positive semidefinite.
Proof. Let y be vector of dimension di (the same dimension that the square matrix ∇ii`i). We
want to see that y>(∇ii`i)y. We consider the vector y′ of dimension d (the same dimension as
JF ), equal to y in the components corresponding to player i and 0 elsewhere. Then, we know
that 0 ≤ y′>JFy′ = y>(∇ii`i)y.
We write (JF )0 = JF − diag(JF ), that is
(JF )0(x) =

0 ∇12`1(x) · · · ∇1n`1(x)
∇21`2(x) 0 · · · ∇2n`2(x)
...
...
. . .
...
∇n1`n(x) ∇n2`n(x) · · · 0

Lemma 1.10. If (JF )0 = −(JF )>0 , then all the diagonal blocks ∇ii`i of JF are positive semidef-
inite if and only if JF is positive semidefinite.
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Proof. We only need to prove from left to right. Let
y =

y1
y2
...
yn

Then,
y>Jωy =
[
(y(1))> (y(2))> · · · (y(n))>
]

∇11`1 ∇12`1 · · · ∇1n`1
∇21`2 ∇22`2 · · · ∇2n`2
...
...
. . .
...
∇n1`n ∇n2`n · · · ∇nn`n


y(1)
y(2)
...
y(n)

=
[
(y(1))> (y(2))> · · · (y(n))>
]

∇11`1 ∇12`1 · · · ∇1n`1
−(∇12`1)> ∇22`2 · · · ∇2n`2
...
...
. . .
...
−(∇1n`1)> −(∇2n`2)> · · · ∇nn`n


y(1)
y(2)
...
y(n)

=
n∑
i=1
(y(i))>(∇ii`i)y(i) +
n∑
i=1
∑
j<i
(y(i))>(∇ij`i)y(j) − (y(j))>(∇ij`i)>y(i)
=
n∑
i=1
(y(i))>(∇ii`i)y(i) +
n∑
i=1
∑
j<i
(y(i))>(∇ij`i)yj − ((∇ij`i)y(j))>y(i)
=
n∑
i=1
(y(i))>(∇ii`i)y(i) (1.4)
From the last expression, we conclude that if ∇ii`i are positive definite for all i, JF is positive
semidefinite.
Lemma 1.11. If (JF )0 = −(JF )>0 for all x ∈ X (or at least at the fixed points), then local
Nash equilibria are stable fixed points.
Proof. By Lemma 1.5 and Lemma 1.10.
1.1.2 Simultaneous gradient descent
Definition 1.12. Simultaneous gradient descent is defined as the dynamics given by
x
(i)
τ+1 = x
(i)
τ − α∇i`i(x(i)τ ) (1.5)
Equivalently, xτ+1 = xτ − αF (xτ ).
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Simultaneous gradient descent is the most basic dynamics in this framework and is not always
guaranteed to converge locally to local Nash equilibria.
Continuous simultaneous gradient corresponds to the ODE ddtx = −F (x).
1.2 Types of n-player differentiable games
1.2.1 Potential games
Definition 1.13. A game is potential1 if there exists a function φ : Rd → R such that for all
i, xˆ(i), x˜(i), x(−i),
φ(xˆ(i), x(−i))− φ(x˜(i), x(−i)) = `i(xˆ(i), x(−i))− `i(x˜(i), x(−i))
Monderer & Shapley [1] showed that
Theorem 1.14. A game is potential if and only if for any point x ∈ X
∇ij`i = ∇ij`j = (∇ji`j)>
The implication from left to right is easy to see
∇ij`j = ∇ijφ = (∇jiφ)> = (∇ji`i)> = ∇ij`i
∇ij`i = (∇ji`j)> is equivalent to Jω being symmetric.
For potential games, it is easy to see that
F (x) =

∇1`1(x)
∇2`2(x)
...
∇n`n(x)
 =

∇1φ(x)
∇2φ(x)
...
∇nφ(x)
 = ∇φ(x)
JF (x) = Hφ(x)
Hence, in this case simultaneous gradient descent is actually gradient descent on the potential
function φ. If gradient descent converges to a local minimum xˆ of φ, Hφ(xˆ)  0, which implies
JF (xˆ)  0. Hence, xˆ is a stable fixed point.
1Note: Our definition of potential game corresponds to exact potential game in [1].
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1.2.2 Hamiltonian games
Definition 1.15. Hamiltonian games are those for which the Hessian of the game is anti-
symmetric, that is JF = A = JF−JF
>
2 .
For Hamiltonian games, we can define a Hamiltonian function H(x) = 12 ||F (x)||2.
We restate Theorem 3 from [2] regarding Hamiltonian games:
Theorem 1.16. When the game is Hamiltonian, we have:
(a) ∇H = A>F
(b) 〈F,∇H〉 = 0. This implies that continuous simultaneous gradient dynamics preserves H.
(c) If JF (x) is invertible everywhere and lim||x||→∞H(x) =∞, gradient descent on H converges
to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (a) ∇H = ∇ (12F>F ) = H>F = A>F
(b) 〈F,∇H〉 = F>A>F and F>A>F = (F>A>F )> = F>AF = −F>A>F , which implies
F>A>F = 0. Now, if x follows the dynamics given by ddtx = −F (x), then
d
dt
H(x(t)) = DH(x(t)) d
dt
x(t) = 〈∇H(x(t)), d
dt
x(t)〉 = −〈∇H(x(t)), F (x(t))〉 = 0
(c) Gradient descent onH will converge to a point xˆ where ∇H(xˆ) = 0, hence JF (xˆ)>F (xˆ) = 0.
Since JF is invertible by assumption, F (xˆ) = 0. Since JF is antisymmetric, it is positive
semidefinite and hence xˆ is a stable fixed point.
1.2.3 Two player zero-sum games
Definition 1.17. Two player zero-sum games are two player games such that `1(x)+`2(x) =
0.
This implies that ∇12`1 = −∇12`2 = −(∇21`2)>. Hence, the Hessian of two player zero-sum
games is
Jω =
[
−∇11`2 −(∇21`2)>
∇21`2 ∇22`2
]
Although they are somewhat related, there is no inclusion between two player Hamiltonian
games and two player zero-sum games:
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• The diagonal blocks of JF might not be zero in zero-sum games, but they must be zero in
the case of Hamiltonian games. This follows from the fact that ∇ii`i must be symmetric
and antisymmetric for Hamiltonian games.
• Hamiltonian games might not fulfill `1(x) + `2(x) = 0, as the losses might contain linear
terms on x that affect the sum but do not show up in H.
Remark 1.18. The game presented in Example 1.1 is Hamiltonian and two player zero-sum.
Remark 1.19. Two player zero-sum games fulfill (JF )0 = −(JF )>0 and hence by Lemma 1.11
all Nash equilibria are stable fixed points.
1.2.4 Zero-sum polymatrix games
The obvious generalization of zero-sum games to n-players would be to require that
∑n
i=1 `i = 0.
However, this definition is not very interesting because any n-player game could be expressed
as an n+ 1-player game for which `n+1 = −
∑n
i=1 `i.
An alternative generalization of the zero-sum condition is the notion of zero-sum polymatrix
games (studied in [3] in the case of finite strategy sets).
Definition 1.20. Zero-sum polymatrix games are games in which for all i such that 1 ≤
i ≤ n,
`i(x) =
∑
j 6=i
`ij(x
(i), x(j))
where `ij(x
(i), x(j)) = −`ji(x(j), x(i)), for all i, j, x(i), x(j).
Zero-sum polymatrix games are the same as two player zero-sum games when n = 2.
Lemma 1.21. Zero-sum polymatrix games fulfill (JF )0 = −(JF )>0 and hence by Lemma 1.11
all Nash equilibria are stable fixed points.
Proof. We just need to see that for all x, i and j 6= i, ∇ij`i = −(∇ji`j)>. We have ∇ij`i =
∇ij`ij = −∇ij`ji = −∇ij`j = −(∇ji`j)>.
1.2.5 Convex Nash Equilibrium Problems
Definition 1.22. An n-player differentiable game is a Convex Nash Equilibrium Problem
(CNEP) if the function l(x) :=
∑n
i=1 `i(x) is convex and for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
• `i(x) = `i(x(i), x(−i)) is a convex function with respect to x(i) when x(−i) is kept fixed
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• `i(x) = `i(x(i), x(−i)) is a concave function with respect to x(−i) when x(i) is kept fixed
CNEPs are interesting because they allow for global convergence results that will be stated in
the following sections. They are closely related to the Variational Inequality Problem (VIP),
which we define below.
Definition 1.23. Given E a Banach space, an operator F : E → E? is monotone if for all
x, y ∈ E,
〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉 ≥ 0
Definition 1.24. A weak solution of the variational inequality (VI) corresponding to
the operator F : Q ⊆ E → E? is a point x? ∈ Q such that
〈F (x), x− x?〉 ≥ 0 (1.6)
for all x ∈ Q.
Definition 1.25. A strong solution of the variational inequality (VI) corresponding to
the operator F : Q ⊆ E → E? is a point x? ∈ Q such that
〈F (x?), x− x?〉 ≥ 0 (1.7)
for all x ∈ Q.
Remark 1.26. If F is monotone, it is immediate to see that any strong solution of the VI is a
weak solution of the VI.
Lemma 1.27. If F is continuous and Q is convex, any weak solution of the VI is a strong
solution of the VI.
Proof. Let x? be a weak solution of the VI. Let w be an arbitrary point in Q and define
x = x? + t(w − x?), which belongs to Q by convexity.
Now, by the definition of weak solution,
〈F (x), x− x?〉 = 〈F (x? + t(w − x?), t(w − x?)〉 ≥ 0
Dividing by t and taking the limit t→ 0, we get
〈F (x?), w − x?〉 ≥ 0
for any w ∈ Q.
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Definition 1.28. The dual gap of the VI is defined as ErrV I : Q→ R
ErrV I(x) = sup
u∈Z
〈F (u), z − u〉 (1.8)
Definition 1.29. A subset X ⊆ Rn is a solid if it is compact, convex and its interior is non-
empty.
The following theorem is very similar to Proposition 3.1 from [4]:
Theorem 1.30. Assume that E = Rd with a norm that makes it a Banach space. Suppose X
is a solid and F : Q ⊆ E → E? is a monotone operator, with int X ⊆ Q. Then,
i The set X? of solutions to (1.6) is a non-empty compact subset of X.
ii The function ErrV I(x) is a closed convex non-negative function on X, finite everywhere on
int X, and equal to 0 exactly at X?.
We restate Proposition 3.2 from [4] in our terminology.
Theorem 1.31 (Proposition 3.2 from [4]). Let X1, ..., Xn as in Equation (1.1) be solids. Assume
that the losses `i are such that the game is a CNEP. Then,
1. The simultaneous gradient F is a monotone operator.
2. When the losses `i are continuous on X, the weak solutions of the VI associated to F and
X are exactly the Nash equilibria of the problem.
Theorem 1.31 means that in CNEPs, the problem of finding Nash equilibria is equivalent to
finding weak solutions of the VI. And Theorem 1.30 provides evidence that finding weak solutions
of the VI is a well-posed problem when the operator is monotone.
1.3 Algorithms
1.3.1 Symplectic Gradient Adjustment
Definition 1.32. The symplectic gradient adjustment (SGA) is given by
xτ+1 = xτ − α
(
F (xτ ) + λA (xτ )
> F (xτ )
)
= xτ − α
(
I + λA (xτ )
>
)
F (xτ )
where A = JF−JF
>
2 .
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The algorithm is presented in The Mechanics of n-Player Differentiable Games [2]. The authors
propose to choose λ such that sign(λ) = sign
(〈F,∇H〉〈A>F,∇H〉), which means that it needs
to be recomputed at each step. This choice makes SGA fulfill five desiderata that they consider
reasonable to expect from dynamics that seek to find stable fixed points (although they do not
imply convergence).
In the following we will consider a variation of SGA in which we set λ = α. Hence, the SGA
dynamics in this article will be
xτ+1 = xτ − α
(
I + αA (xτ )
>
)
F (xτ ) (1.9)
Since we are not choosing the sign of λ according to the criterion stated in [2], we cannot claim
that the five desiderata will be fulfilled. In particular, we cannot claim that the last two will
hold.
1.3.2 LookAhead and LOLA
LookAhead is another update that was presented and named in Stable Opponent Shaping in
Differentiable Games [5], although it had been mentioned in [6].
Definition 1.33. In compact form, the LookAhead update can be written as
xτ+1 = xτ − α (I − α(JF )0 (xτ ))F (xτ ) (1.10)
where (JF )0 has outer diagonal blocks equal to JF and is zero in the diagonal blocks. That is,
(JF )0(x) =

0 ∇12`1(x) · · · ∇1n`1(x)
∇21`2(x) 0 · · · ∇2n`2(x)
...
...
. . .
...
∇n1`n(x) ∇n2`n(x) · · · 0

[5] gives an intuition for LookAhead. LookAhead is related to Learning with Opponent-Learning
Awareness (LOLA) [7]. In LOLA, each player computes its update as the gradient of a modified
loss function in which the players have already moved. The modified loss function is
`i(x
(1) + ∆x(1), ..., x(i), ..., x(n) + ∆x(n)) ≈ `i(x(1), ..., x(i), ..., x(n)) +
∑
j 6=i
(∇j`i(x))>∆x(j)
Computing the gradient of this expression with respect to x(i) results in
∇i`i +
∑
j 6=i
(∇ji`i(x))>∆x(j) + (∇j`i(x))>∇i∆x(j) (1.11)
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Now, we suppose that the other players move according to gradient descent on their losses, that
is, ∆x(j) = −α∇j`j . Hence, Equation (1.11) becomes
∇i`i(x)− α
∑
j 6=i
(∇ji`i(x))>∇j`j(x) + (∇ji`j(x))>∇j`i(x)

And hence the update of player i according to LOLA is
x
(i)
τ+1 = x
(i)
τ − α
∇i`i(x)− α
∑
j 6=i
(∇ji`i(x))>∇j`j(x) + (∇ji`j(x))>∇j`i(x)

The update of player i according to LookAhead amounts to dropping the second term of the
summation. That is,
x
(i)
τ+1 = x
(i)
τ − α
∇i`i(x)− α
∑
j 6=i
(∇ji`i(x))>∇j`j(x)
 (1.12)
Going back to Equation (1.11), we see that in LookAhead we overlook the dependency of ∆x(j)
on x(i). It is also easy to see that putting the update in Equation (1.12) in a compact form
corresponds to Equation (1.10).
1.3.3 Extra-gradient and mirror-prox
The extra-gradient method was introduced by Korpelevich [8] as a method to solve variational
inequalities. There have been several works studying it and its generalized version, mirror-
prox. All the theoretical results for extra-gradient or mirror-prox are under the assumption
that the operator is monotone, and convex Nash equilibrium problems fulfill that condition
(Theorem 1.31).
Definition 1.34. Each step of the extra-gradient method consists of two substeps:
xτ+1/2 = xτ − αF (xτ ) (1.13)
xτ+1 = xτ − αF (xτ+1/2) (1.14)
Lemma 1.35. The linearized version of extra-gradient is:
xτ+1 = xτ − α (I − αJF (xτ ))F (xτ ) (1.15)
Proof. From Equations (1.13) and (1.14), we get
xτ+1 = xτ − αF (xτ − αF (xτ )) = xτ − αF (xτ ) + α2JF (xτ )F (xτ ) + o(α2) (1.16)
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Linearized extra-gradient is noticeably similar to LookAhead. The only difference is that in
LookAhead players do not extrapolate themselves, while in LookAhead they do.
The mirror-prox method is the formulation of the extra-gradient method for Banach spaces.
[9] is a good reference for mirror-prox and for the formulation of gradient descent for Banach
spaces, known as mirror descent. I am including a brief overview on these two methods, as
mirror-prox will be relevant in Chapter (3).
There is no notion of gradient in a Banach space, only of differential. Given E a Banach space
and f : E → R, we will write ∇f : E → E? to denote the differential because it is costumary
in the optimization literature. In the following, we will assume E = Rn but we do not make
any assumption on the norm (other than the space is Banach). In the case of games F will now
denote the concatenation of the differentials.
Definition 1.36. Given a compact convex set X ⊆ E and D ⊆ E such that X ⊆ int D, the
mirror map is defined as a continuously differentiable and µ-strongly convex function Φ : D → R.
Definition 1.37. Given a mirror map Φ, the Bregman divergence DΦ : int D × int D → R is
defined as
DΦ(x, y) := Φ(x)− Φ(y)− 〈∇Φ(y), x− y〉 (1.17)
It is clear that ∇Φ maps D to E?.
Definition 1.38. Mirror descent is given by the following update:
∇Φ(yτ+1) = ∇Φ(xτ )− αF (xτ ) (1.18)
xτ+1 = argminx∈X∩D DΦ(x, yτ+1) (1.19)
We can use the differential of the Legendre transform Φ? to compute yτ+1, as Equation (1.18)
can be rewritten as
yτ+1 = ∇Φ?(∇Φ(xτ )− αF (xτ )) (1.20)
[9] contains convergence results for mirror descent in the monotone operator case (CNEP by
Theorem 1.31). It is important to remark that it is necessary to take decreasing stepsizes to
achieve convergence even when the losses are smooth. If we take stepsizes decreasing as 1/
√
t,
ErrV I(x¯t) (Definition 1.8) decreases as O(1/
√
t), where x¯t =
1
t
∑t
τ=1 xτ .
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Definition 1.39. Mirror-prox is given by the following update:
∇Φ(yτ+1/2) = ∇Φ(xτ )− αF (xτ ) (1.21)
xτ+1/2 = argminx∈X∩D DΦ(x, yτ+1/2) (1.22)
∇Φ(yτ+1) = ∇Φ(xτ )− αF (xτ+1/2) (1.23)
xτ+1 = argminx∈X∩D DΦ(x, yτ+1) (1.24)
[10] and [11] provide convergence rates for mirror-prox in the non-noisy and noisy cases re-
spectively, and the explanation in the latter is clearer. [9] contains some results as well. The
most important result for mirror prox is that when the losses are L-smooth (gradients ∇i`i are
L-Lipschitz), the game is a CNEP and the stepsizes are constant, ErrV I(x¯t) decreases as O(1/t),
where x¯t =
1
t
∑t
τ=1 xτ . Chapter (3) contains detailed results on mirror-prox.
For the following lemma we use the prox-mapping notation from [11].
Lemma 1.40. Let the prox-mapping Pz(ξ) be defined as
Pz(ξ) = argminu∈X∩D{Φ(u) + 〈ξ −∇Φ(z), u〉} = argminu∈X∩D{DΦ(z, u) + 〈ξ, u〉} (1.25)
An equivalent formulation of mirror-descent is
xτ+1 = Pxτ (αF (xτ )) (1.26)
An equivalent formulation of mirror-prox is
xτ+1/2 = Pxτ (αF (xτ )) (1.27)
xτ+1 = Pxτ (αF (xτ+1/2)) (1.28)
Proof. For mirror descent,
xτ+1 = argminx∈X∩D DΦ(x, yτ+1) = argminx∈X∩D Φ(x)− 〈∇Φ(yτ+1), x〉
= argminx∈X∩D Φ(x)− 〈∇Φ(xτ )− αF (xτ ), x〉 = argminx∈X∩D 〈αF (xτ ), x〉+DΦ(x, xτ )
(1.29)
The proof for mirror-prox is analogous.
Remark 1.41. If we choose Φ = 12‖ · ‖22 for mirror-prox, we recover extra-gradient.
Chapter 2
Local Convergence to Stable Fixed
Points
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Notation
Instead of x, in this chapter we will use w for the vector of concatenated parameters. We do
that to avoid confusion, as x is used in lemmas.
Also, we use H := JF to denote the Hessian of the game. Analogously, H0 = (JF )0. Since H
and H0 will be used a lot, this will shorten expressions. Whenever there is no ambiguity, we
will also use H to denote H evaluated at a stable fixed point wˆ.
2.1.2 Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrices dependent on a parameter
In order to analyze the convergence of the algorithms, we will make use of some results about
the spectrum of matrices that depend on a parameter. There are several articles on the subject.
We will use several theorems from [12], which are stated below (adapting the notation and the
statements).
We consider a function A : R→ Rn×n, where Rn×n denotes the space of square n× n matrices.
We write α for the parameter and A(α) for the matrix. In all the following theorems we consider
each matrix element aij(α) of A(α) to be an analytic function of α. We use λ(α) to refer to
eigenvalues of A(α).
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Theorem 2.1 (Theorem 1 of [12]). If at α = α0 there exists an eigenvalue λ(α0) which is
simple (unrepeated), then there exists a neighborhood of α0 within which the function λ(α) is
regular (analytic and single valued).
As in [12], we will say that a matrix A ∈ Rn is of simple structure if it is diagonalizable over C.
That is, we allow for repeated eigenvalues but all Jordan blocks must be 1-dimensional.
Theorem 2.2 (Theorem 5 of [12]). Let A(α0) be a matrix of simple structure. If λ0 is a
simple eigenvalue of A(α0) and x, y ∈ Rn are the right and left eigenvalues corresponding to λ0
respectively, then
dλ
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=α0
=
y> dAdα (α0)x
y>x
Theorem 2.3 (Theorem 6 of [12]). If A(α0) is a matrix of simple structure and A
(q)(α0) is
the first non-vanishing derivative of A(α) at α = α0, then the n eigenvalues λ(α) of A(α) are
differentiable at least q times at λ0 and their first q − 1 derivatives all vanish at λ0.
Theorem 2.4 (Theorem 7 of [12]). With the assumptions of Theorem 2.3, let λ(α0) be an
eigenvalue of A(α0) with multiplicity m and let the columns of the n×m matrices Xm, Ym span
the right eigenspace X1 and the left eigenspace Y1 respectively. If these matrices are chosen so
that X>mYm = I, then the m derivatives λ(q)(α0) (of the m eigenvalues that coincide at α0) are
the eigenvalues of the matrix Y >mA(q)(α0)Xm.
2.1.3 Relation between positive definiteness and eigenvalues
Definition 2.5. We define a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n to be positive definite if ∀x ∈ Rn such
that x 6= 0, we have x>Ax > 0.
Definition 2.6. Analogously, a matrix A is positive semidefinite if ∀x ∈ Rn, we have x>Ax ≥ 0.
Equivalently, a general matrix is positive (semi)definite if and only if its symmetric part is
positive (semi)definite.
Lemma 2.7. Let A ∈ Rn×n positive definite. Then all the eigenvalues of A have positive real
part.
Proof. Let µ+iν be an eigenvalue of A with eigenvector x+iy, such that µ, ν ∈ R and x, y ∈ Rn.
Then,
((A− µ)− iν)(x+ iy) = 0 =⇒ (A− µ)x+ νy + i((A− µ)y − νx) = 0
This implies that (A− µ)x+ νy = 0 and (A− µ)y − νx = 0. And now,
x>(A− µ)x+ y>(A− µ)y = −νx>y + νy>x = 0
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Hence,
µ =
x>Ax+ y>Ay
x>x+ y>y
which is clearly positive since A is positive definite.
Lemma 2.8. Let A ∈ Rn×n positive semidefinite. Then all the eigenvalues of A have nonneg-
ative real part.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 2.7.
2.1.4 Spectral radius and convergence
We recall that the spectral radius of a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n is defined as the largest absolute
value of its eigenvalues (real or complex).
Theorem 2.9. Let A ∈ Cn×n with spectral radius ρ(A). Then ρ(A) < 1 if and only if
limk→∞Ak = 0. On the other hand, if ρ(A) > 1, limk→∞ ||Ak|| =∞.
Proof. Proof in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectral radius.
Lemma 2.10 is used in the proof of Theorem 2.11. The proof for both is in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.10. If A ∈ Rn×n is such that ρ(A) < 1, then there exists C > 0 such that for any x0
the sequence (xτ )k∈N in Rn defined as xτ+1 = Axτ fulfills ||xτ ||2 ≤ C||x0||2, ∀k ≥ 0.
Theorem 2.11. If A ∈ Rn×n and ρ(A) < 1, the sequence (x˜τ )k∈N taking values in Rn and
defined as
x˜τ+1 = Ax˜τ + f(x˜τ )
where limx→0
f(x)
|x| = 0, there is a neighborhood U of 0 such that (x˜τ )k∈N converges to 0 when
x˜0 ∈ U .
2.2 Conditions for local convergence
SGA, LookAhead and linearized extra-gradient (Equations (1.9), (1.10) can be expressed as a
single expression:
wτ+1 = wτ − αX (wτ , α)F (wτ ) (2.1)
where X (w, α) = I+αA (w)> for SGA, X (w, α) = I−αH0 (w) for LookAhead and X (w, α) =
I − αH (w) for linearized extra-gradient.
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Definition 2.12. We say that an algorithm is locally convergent to a fixed point wˆ if there
exists a neighborhood U of wˆ such that if the first iterate w0 belongs to U , wτ converges to wˆ.
Lemma 2.13. Let wˆ be a fixed point of the game. Then, we can write
wτ+1 − wˆ = (I − αX (wˆ, α)H(wˆ))(wτ − wˆ) + o(|wτ − wˆ|) (2.2)
Let H˜(α) = X (wˆ, α)H(wˆ). If ρ(I − αH˜(α)) < 1, wτ converges to wˆ if w0 is in a certain
neighborhood of wˆ, i.e., there is local convergence.
Proof. We can write
wτ+1 − wˆ = wτ − wˆ − αX (wτ , α)F (wτ )
And now, since F is zero at the fixed point wˆ by definition, we can write the Taylor expansions
F (wτ ) = DF (wˆ)(wτ − wˆ) + o(|wτ − wˆ|) = H(wˆ)(wτ − wˆ) + o(|wτ − wˆ|)
X (wτ , α) = X (wˆ, α) +O(|wτ − wˆ|)
We are keeping α fixed in the last equation. Thus, we get
wτ+1 − wˆ = wτ − wˆ − αX (wˆ, α)H(wˆ)(wτ − wˆ) + o(|wτ − wˆ|) (2.3)
We cannot directly apply Theorem 2.9 to Equation (2.2), because the equation contains the term
o(|wτ − wˆ|). To deal with this, we use Theorem 2.11, which is proved in Appendix A.1. We
apply Theorem 2.11 with x˜τ = wτ−wˆ and A = I−αH˜(α). We get that if ρ(I−αH˜(α)) < 1,
Lemma 2.14. Assume that H(wˆ) diagonalizes over C. Denote by λj(α) the eigenvalues of
H˜(α), where j is between 1 and n. If
Re(λj(0)) > 0 (2.4)
for all j between 1 and n, there is local convergence to wˆ.
Proof. Since H˜(0) = X (wˆ, 0)H(wˆ) = H(wˆ), we know H˜(0) diagonalizes over C (which in
Section 2.1.2 we refer to as having simple structure).
The eigenvalues of I − αH˜(α) are 1 − αλj(α). Since ρ(I − αH˜(α)) = maxj |1 − αλj(α)|, the
condition on the spectral radius means that for all j
|1− αλj(α)| < 1 ⇐⇒ |1− αλj(α)|2 < 1 ⇐⇒ (1− αλ∗j (α))(1− αλj(α)) < 1 (2.5)
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Obviously, for α = 0 both sides are equal. By Theorem 2.3 and by the fact that the elements
of H˜(α) are analytic on α (they are in fact affine functions), all the eigenvalues λj(α) are
differentiable functions of α. Hence, a sufficient condition for Equation (2.5) to hold for some
α > 0 is
d
dα
((1− αλ∗j (α))(1− αλj(α)))
∣∣∣∣
α=0
< 0
We develop this expression
d
dα
((1− αλ∗j (α))(1− αλj(α)))
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
d
dα
(1− α(λj(α) + λ?j (α)) + α2λj(α)λ?j (α))
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
− (λj(α) + λ?j (α))
∣∣∣∣
α=0
− α
(
d
dα
λj(α) +
d
dα
λ?j (α)
)∣∣∣∣
α=0
+ 2αλj(α)λ
?
j (α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
+ α2
dλj(α)
dα
λ?j (α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
+ α2λj(α)
dλ?j (α)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= −2Re(λj(0)) < 0 (2.6)
A sufficient condition for Re(λj(0)) > 0 for all j is H being positive definite, by Lemma 2.7.
However, H being positive semidefinite is not enough to ensure positivity of the real part of its
eigenvalues. As a counterexample, a positive semidefinite matrix can have 0 as an eigenvalue.
Re(λj(0)) < 0 implies that there is no local convergence. We look more carefully at the case for
which Re(λj(0)) = 0.
Lemma 2.15. Let wˆ be a stable fixed point. As in Theorem 2.14, assume that H(wˆ) diagonal-
izes over C and let λj(α) be the eigenvalues of H˜(α), where j is between 1 and n. Assume that
Re(λj(0)) ≥ 0 for all j between 1 and n, and that if Re(λj(0)) = 0,
λ2j,0 < 2Re
(
d
dα
λj(0)
)
(2.7)
Then, there is local convergence to wˆ.
Proof. The case Re(λj(0)) > 0 for all j is covered by Lemma 2.14. When Re(λj(0)) = 0, the
second order sufficient condition to have ‖1− αλ∗j (α)‖22 < 1 for α > 0 small is:
d2
dα2
((1− αλ∗j (α))(1− αλj(α)))
∣∣∣∣
α=0
< 0 (2.8)
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We develop this expression keeping only the terms that might not evaluate to 0
d2
dα2
((1− αλ∗j (α))(1− αλj(α)))
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= −
(
d
dα
λj(α) +
d
dα
λ?j (α)
)∣∣∣∣
α=0
−
(
d
dα
λj(α) +
d
dα
λ?j (α)
)∣∣∣∣
α=0
+ 2λj(α)λ
?
j (α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= −4Re
(
d
dα
λj(α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
)
+ 2|λ(0)|2 < 0
(2.9)
Since λ(0) is imaginary, we can write λ(0) = iλj,0. Then, we end up with
λ2j,0 < 2Re
(
d
dα
λj(0)
)
(2.10)
as the sufficient condition.
To be able to write Equation (2.8) we must check that λj(α) is twice differentiable. The
regularity of λj is deduced from the discussion in [12] after the statement of Theorem 3 of that
article.
2.3 Local convergence for SGA
Theorem 2.16. Let (wτ )k∈N be a sequence on R built according to the Symplectic Gradient
Adjustment given by Equation (1.9). Let wˆ be a stable fixed point, that is, F (wˆ) = 0 and
H(wˆ)  0. Let us assume also that H(wˆ) is invertible and diagonalizable (over C).
Then, there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ Rd of wˆ such that if wˆ0 ∈ U , wτ converges to wˆ, i.e.,
there is local convergence to wˆ.
Proof. The proof consists on checking that for each eigenvalue λj(α) of H˜(α), either the first
order condition (Equation (2.4)) holds, or Re(λj(0)) = 0 and the second order condition (Equa-
tion (2.7)) holds.
Step 1. Since H(wˆ) = H˜(0) is positive semidefinite by hypothesis, by Lemma 2.8 all its
eigenvalues have nonnegative real part. The assumptions for Lemma 2.14 are satisfied whenever
all the eigenvalues have strictly positive real part and the proof ends here for this case. The rest
of the proof will deal with the case in which H(wˆ) = H˜(0) has some imaginary eigenvalues.
Step 2. We use the notation H = H(wˆ). Let us consider the matrix H2 + 2A>H. We can
rewrite it as
H2 + 2A>H = H2 + 2
H> −H
2
H = H>H
Since H is assumed to be invertible, we conclude that H2 + 2A>H is positive definite.
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Now, H + α(H2 + 2A>H) is also positive definite for α > 0, since H is positive semidefinite.
We define Hˆ(α) = H + α(H2 + 2A>H).
Step 3 (simple imaginary eigenvalues). Let iλj,0 be a simple imaginary eigenvalue of H
with right eigenvector xj and left eigenvector yj . Let λˆj(α) be the eigenvalue of Hˆ(α) such that
λˆj(0) = iλj,0, which is a regular function of α by Theorem 2.1.
By Theorem 2.2, λˆj(α) satisfies
d
dα
λˆj(0) =
y>j
dHˆ
dα (0)xj
y>j xj
And dHˆ(α)dα = H
2 + 2A>H, which means
d
dα
λˆj(0) =
y>j H
2xj
y>j xj
+
y>j (2A
>H)xj
y>j xj
= (iλj,0)
2
y>j xj
y>j xj
+2
y>j A
>Hxj
y>j xj
= −λ2j,0+2
y>j A
>Hxj
y>j xj
(2.11)
Since by definition H˜(α) = X (wˆ, α)H(wˆ) = H(wˆ) + αA(wˆ)>H(wˆ) for SGA, H˜(0) = H(wˆ) =
Hˆ(0). Hence, iλj,0 is also an eigenvalue of H˜(0). As in Section 2.2, we use λj(α) to denote the
eigenvalue of H˜(α) such that λj(0) = iλj,0. By Theorem 2.2,
d
dα
λj(0) =
y>j
dH˜
dα (0)xj
y>j xj
And dH˜(α)dα = A
>H, which means
d
dα
λj(0) =
y>j A
>Hxj
y>j xj
(2.12)
Combining Equations (2.11) and (2.12), we get
d
dα
λˆj(0) = −λ2j,0 + 2
d
dα
λj(0) (2.13)
Step 3 (imaginary eigenvalues with multiplicity). Let iλj1,0 = iλj2,0 = · · · = iλjm,0 be
an imaginary eigenvalue of H with multiplicity m, where j1, ..., jm are between 1 and n. We
will write J := j1, ..., jm and iλJ,0 := iλj1,0 = · · · = iλjm,0. Let XJ the d ×m right eigenvalue
matrix and YJ the d × m left eigenvalue matrix. Choose XJ , YJ such that Y TJ XJ = Id. Let
λˆj1(α), ..., λˆjm(α) be the eigenvalues of Hˆ(α) such that λˆj1(0) = · · · = λˆjm(0) = iλJ,0. And let
λj1(α), ..., λjm(α) be the eigenvalues of H˜(α) such that λj1(0) = · · · = λjm(0) = iλJ,0.
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Let eig(A) denote the vector of eigenvalues of matrix A. Let us denote by ddα ΛˆJ(0) the vector
formed by the m derivatives ddα λˆj1(α), ...,
d
dα λˆjm(α). By Theorem 2.4,
d
dα
ΛˆJ(0) = eig
(
Y TJ
d
dα
Hˆ(0)XJ
)
(2.14)
Let us define ddαΛJ(0) as the vector formed by the m derivatives
d
dαλj1(α), ...,
d
dαλjm(α). Using
the same reasoning as in Equations (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), we get
d
dα
ΛˆJ(0) = eig
(
−λ2J,0Id + 2Y TJ A>HXJ
)
= −λ2j,01d + 2eig
(
Y TJ A
>HXJ
)
= −λ2J,01d + 2
d
dα
ΛJ(0) (2.15)
Hence, Equation (2.14) holds for all λj1(α), ..., λjn(α) as well. That means that we can treat
the multiplicity case and the simple case together for the rest of the proof.
Step 4. Since Hˆ(α) is positive definite for α > 0, we know that Re(λˆj(α)) > 0. Re(λˆj(0)) =
1
2(iλj,0 − iλj,0) = 0 and that means that we must have
0 ≤ d
dα
Re(λˆj)(α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
d
dα
(
1
2
λˆj(α) +
1
2
λˆ∗j (α)
)∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
1
2
d
dα
λˆj(α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
+
1
2
(
d
dα
λˆj(α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
)∗
= Re
(
d
dα
λˆj(α)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
)
(2.16)
Using Step 3, we get
0 ≤ Re
(
−λ2j,0 + 2
d
dα
λj(0)
)
= −λ2j,0 + 2Re
(
d
dα
λj(0)
)
(2.17)
This inequality is the second order condition expressed in Equation (2.7) except that it is not
strict. Achieving strictness for the inequality of Equation (2.17) concludes the proof.
Step 5. In the following the objective is to prove strictness in Equation (2.17). H>H =
H2 + 2A>H is a symmetric positive definite matrix. Hence, it has real positive eigenvalues.
Let λm be the smallest eigenvalue of H
>H. Let us consider H¯(α) = H+αλmI. The eigenvectors
of H¯(α) are the same as the eigenvectors of H. Let be xj,R + ixj,I be a right eigenvalue of H
corresponding to the imaginary eigenvalue iλj,0, with xj,R, xj,I ∈ Rn (if iλj,0 has multiplicity,
we just pick any of the right eigenvalues).
We use xj,R(α) + ixj,I(α) to denote any right eigenvector of Hˆ(α) with eigenvalue λˆj(α) such
that λˆj(0) = iλj,0.
We use λ¯j(α) to denote any eigenvalue of H¯(α) such that λ¯j(0) = iλj,0. It is easy to see that
λ¯j(α) admits the expression λ¯j(α) = iλj,0 + αλm.
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Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2.7, we get:
0 = Re(iλj,0) =
x>j,RHxj,R + x
>
j,IHxj,I
x>j,Rxj,R + x
>
j,Ixj,I
(2.18)
Re(λˆj(α)) =
xj,R(α)
>(H + α(H2 + 2A>H))xj,R(α) + xj,I(α)>(H + α(H2 + 2A>H))xj,I(α)
xj,R(α)>xj,R(α) + xj,I(α)>xj,I(α)
(2.19)
Re(λ¯j(α)) =
x>j,R(H + αλmI)xj,R + x
>
j,I(H + αλmI)xj,I
x>j,Rxj,R + x
>
j,Ixj,I
(2.20)
Now, since H2 + 2A>H  λI,
xj,R(α)
>(H2 + 2A>H)xj,R(α) + xj,I(α)>(H2 + 2A>H)xj,I(α)
xj,R(α)>xj,R(α) + xj,I(α)>xj,I(α)
≥ λmxj,R(α)
>xj,R(α) + λmxj,I(α)>xj,I(α)
xj,R(α)>xj,R(α) + xj,I(α)>xj,I(α)
= λm =
λmx
>
j,Rxj,R + λmx
>
j,Ixj,I
x>j,Rxj,R + x
>
j,Ixj,I
(2.21)
Also, since H is positive semidefinite and using Equation (2.18),
xj,R(α)
>Hxj,R(α) + xj,I(α)>Hxj,I(α)
xj,R(α)>xj,R(α) + xj,I(α)>xj,I(α)
≥ 0 = x
>
j,RHxj,R + x
>
j,IHxj,I
x>j,Rxj,R + x
>
j,Ixj,I
(2.22)
Adding inequality (2.21) times α and inequality (2.22) and using Equations (2.19) and (2.20),
we get
Re(λˆj(α)) ≥ Re(λ¯j(α))
for all α ≥ 0. And since Re(λ¯j(α)) = αλm > 0, this concludes the proof.
2.4 Local convergence for LookAhead in zero-sum games
Lemma 2.17. If H0 = −H>0 (that is, (JF )0 = −(JF )>0 ), SGA and LookAhead are the same
algorithm. In particular, for two player zero-sum games and zero-sum polymatrix games, SGA
and LookAhead are the same algorithm.
Proof. LookAhead corresponds to X (x, α) = I −αH0(x) (Equation (2.1)). SGA corresponds to
X (x, α) = I + αA>(x). If H0 = −H>0 , we use that the diagonal blocks ∇iili are symmetric to
get the following result:
A> =
H> −H
2
=
H>0 −H0
2
= −H0 (2.23)
H0 = −H>0 is fulfilled for two player zero-sum games and zero-sum polymatrix games by
Remark 1.19 and Lemma 1.21.
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Theorem 2.18. If H0 = −H>0 , LookAhead (and SGA) are locally convergent at all local Nash
equilibria w? such that H(w?) is invertible and diagonalizable (over C).
Proof. With the appropriate assumptions, local convergence to stable fixed points for LookA-
head in the case H0 = −H>0 is implied by the result for SGA in Theorem 2.16 and by
Lemma 2.17. By Lemma 1.11, H0 = −H>0 implies that all local Nash equilibria are stable
fixed points. This concludes the proof.
2.5 Local convergence for linearized extra-gradient
Theorem 2.19. Let wˆ be a stable fixed point and assume that H(wˆ) diagonalizes over C (no
invertibility requirement). Then, linearized extra-gradient (Lemma 1.35) is locally convergent to
wˆ.
Proof. Since H(wˆ)  0, Re(λj(0)) ≥ 0 for all j between 1 and n by Lemma 2.8. If Re(λj(0)) > 0
for all j between 1 and n, local convergence follows from Lemma 2.14. If there exists j between 1
and n such that Re(λj(0)) = 0 (and hence, λj(0) = iλj,0), we just need to see that Equation (2.7)
is fulfilled. Then, we conclude by Lemma 2.15.
Linearized extra-gradient corresponds to X (w, α) = I − αH(w) (Equation (2.1)). Hence,
H˜(α) = X (wˆ, α)H(wˆ) = (I − αH (wˆ))H(wˆ) = H(wˆ)− αH(wˆ)2 (2.24)
By Theorem 2.2, if iλj,0 is a simple eigenvalue
d
dα
λj(0) =
y>j
dH˜
dα (0)xj
y>j xj
=
y>j
dH˜
dα (0)xj
y>j xj
=
y>j (−H(wˆ)2)xj
y>j xj
= λ2j,0
If iλJ,0 has multiplicity, using the reasoning from Equation (2.14):
d
dα
ΛJ(0) = eig
(
Y TJ
d
dα
H˜(0)XJ
)
= eig
(
Y TJ (−H(wˆ)2)XJ
)
= λ2J,01d (2.25)
Hence, for all j between 1 and n,
λ2j,0 < 2λ
2
j,0 = 2Re
(
d
dα
λj(0)
)
(2.26)
which is Equation (2.7).
Chapter 3
Stochastic Opponent Extrapolation
Data-driven model training is increasingly relying on finding Nash equilibria with provable
techniques, e.g., for GANs and multi-agent RL. In this paper, we analyse a new extragradient
method, that performs gradient extrapolations and updates on a random subset of players at
each iteration. This approach provably exhibits the same rate of convergence as full extragradi-
ent in non-smooth stochastic monotonous games. We propose an additional variance reduction
mechanism for this to hold for smooth monotonous games. By reducing the memory footprint,
our approach makes extrapolation amenable to massive multiplayer settings, and brings sur-
prising empirical speed-ups. We demonstrate the efficiency of player sampling on large-scale
non-smooth and non-strictly monotonous games. We show that the joint use of extrapolation
and player sampling allows to train and find better generative models on CIFAR10.
3.1 Introduction
A growing number of recent models require dealing with multiple interacting objectives, such as
generative adversarial networks [13], imaginative agents [14], hierarchical reinforcement learning
[15, 16] and multi-agent reinforcement learning in general [17]. All these examples can be cast
as games where players are modules that compete or cooperate.
Multi-agent problems are challenging for several reasons. First, there is no clear notion of ob-
jective to optimize since there are multiple ones. Many options are then possible: optimizing
all the objectives (either simultaneously or alternatively) or generating more appropriated se-
quences of objectives to optimize [18–20]. Another more natural approach is the notion of Nash
equilibrium in multi-agent systems. It consists in a solution where no player can do better
by unilaterally changing its strategy. However, finding a mixed Nash equilibrium is known to
be PPAD-complete [21]. Finally, a common practice to optimize single objective functions in
24
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machine learning consists in running the gradient descent algorithm which is known to converge
to local minima under mild conditions [22, 23]. However, since each loss depends on the other
agents’ parameters in multi-agent games, gradient descent fails at finding the Nash equilibrium
even in very simple settings – see examples in [5, 24].
Despite all these drawbacks, it is possible to find one Nash equilibrium for some class of games.
Among the numerous examples, we consider in this paper the class of convex n-player games (see
below for a formal definition) for which the Nash equilibrium exists but may not be unique [25].
Finding a Nash equilibrium in this setting is equivalent to solve a variational inequality (VI) [25,
26]. Two modifications of standard gradient descent are known to solve the VIP problem
and therefore to converge to a Nash equilibrium, averaging [27, 28] and extrapolation with
averaging (commonly known as the extragradient method [8]). It is shown to be theoretically
and empirically faster than averaging and has been extensively studied over the last years. The
extrapolation can be understood as an opponent shaping step in a n-player game: the player
looks one step in the future and anticipates the next moves of his opponents.
However, in games, extragradient requires a full pass over all the players and evaluating their
full gradients in two different points. This operation may represent a bottleneck in terms of time
and memory in large-scale multi-agent systems such as multitask learning where each task can
be seen as a player [29–31], generative multi-adversarial networks [32] or consensus in computer
science [33].
3.1.1 Organisation and contributions.
This paper analyzes a class of stochastic variants of the extragradient algorithm that aim at
reducing the memory cost and computational complexity in convex n-player games. Since the
main bottleneck is the gradient computation in large-scale games, we present a doubly-stochastic
version of extragradient that involves two different samplings.
In our setting, we assume that for each player, the loss function is defined as an empirical mean
over data estimated functions (as it is standard in machine learning). The doubly-stochastic
updates consist in simultaneously using two different sampling strategies. First, analogously to
stochastic gradient descent [22, 34], the gradients are computed by randomly selecting mini-
batches of data-estimated gradients. Secondly, instead of computing at each step all the players
gradients to make the extrapolation, we randomly select a mini-batch of players gradients. Note
that this mini-batch is common for all the players and in that sense, the agents updates are
made in a centralized manner.
We make a sharp analysis of the rate of convergence under minimal assumptions (convex game
and non-smooth losses). In particular, we show that if the stepsize is modified accordingly to
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the sampling strategy, sampling over players and data has no downside compared to full-batch
extragradient algorithm. The constants in the rates may even be improved when the algorithm
uses importance sampling. We also introduce a variance-reduced version of the algorithm to
obtain faster rates in the case of smooth losses. Table 3.1 summarize the convergence rates of
those methods.
We performed several numerical experiments that compare algorithms for n-players game (e.g.
GANs or Particle Swarm).
Table 3.1: Convergence rates with respect to number of computations c, in existing work and
in this paper. G is a bound on the gradient norm L the loss Lipschitz constant when available,
σ2 bounds the noise in gradient estimation, k is the number of sampled players among n, Ω is
the diameter of the parameter space. See text for details.
Algorithm Convergence rate (non-smooth case) Convergence rate (smooth case)
Juditsky et al. [11] O
(√
Ωn2(4G2+σ2)
c
)
O
(
ΩLn3/2
c +
√
Ωn2σ2
c
)
Doubly stochastic No VR: O
(√
Ωn(3G2n+(σ2−G2)k)
c
)
With VR: O
(
ΩLn2√
kc
+
√
Ωnkσ2
c
)
3.2 Related work
An important number of works analyze convergence in convex n-players games, see for example
[35, 36]. In this paper, we focus on finding the Nash equilibrium in convex n-player games
that is equivalent to solving a Variational Inequality (VI) [25, 26]. One algorithm to solve such
problem is the extra-gradient algorithm originally introduced by Korpelevich [8] and developed
by Nemirovski [10] and Nesterov [37]. A number of recent works proposed stochastic [11, 38]
or adaptive variants [39] of the extra-gradient for stochastic variational inequalities where the
gradient is a noisy estimate. On the other hand, [40] consider multi-agent games on networks
and analyze a stochastic variant of extra-gradient that consists in randomly updating some
players. However, they consider exact gradient estimates while we work with noisy estimates of
the gradients from the data. Moreover, their analysis holds for smooth losses and the benefits of
sampling players are not clearly stated. In this work, we unify these two approaches and study
the case where we sample over players’ losses and estimate noisy versions of their gradients.
Several papers proposed variance-reduced variants for solving stochastic variational inequalities
[41–43]. However, the variance reduction is applied to the noise arising from the data while we
do it on the noise from the sampling of players.
On the other hand, a number of algorithms have been proposed in the non-convex setting under
restricted assumptions on the game, for example WoLF in two-player two-action games [44], pol-
icy prediction in two-player two-action bimatrix games [6], AWESOME in repeated games [45],
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Optimistic Mirror Descent in two-player bilinear zero-sum games [46] and Consensus Optimisa-
tion in two-player zero-sum games [47]. Mertikopoulos et al. [48] proved asymptotic convergence
results for extragradient in a slightly non-convex setting. Other methods have also been pro-
posed for GANs training including [24, 49, 50]. Globally, solving the non-convex variationnal
inequality still remains an open problem.
Extra-gradient can also be seen as an opponent shaping method: in the extrapolation step, the
player looks one step in the future and anticipates the next moves of his opponents. Many
recent papers designed algorithms that make use of the opponents’ information to converge to
an equilibrium [5–7]. In particular, the Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA)
algorithm is known for encouraging cooperation in cooperative games [7]. We show that it can
be seen as mirror descent on a extrapolated loss. This is a different form of extrapolation from
the one of extragradient since the extrapolation is made at the level of the loss.
Lastly, some recent works proposed algorithms to modify the dynamics of simultaneous gradient
by adding an adjustment term in order to converge to the Nash equilibrium and avoid oscillations
[2, 47, 51]. One caveat of these works is that they need to estimate the Jacobian which may be
expensive in large-scale systems or even impossible when dealing with non-smooth losses as we
consider in our setting. This line of research is orthogonal to this paper where we do not modify
the dynamics and we just investigate the effect of the noise from the estimates of the gradients
and from the sampling over players in extra-gradient.
3.3 Solving convex games with partial information
Before presenting the doubly-stochastic extra-gradient algorithm and its analysis in Section 3.4,
we first present the general framework of games and the assumptions we make.
3.3.1 Convex n-player games and the variational inequality problem
In this section, we consider the problem of multi-agent learning as a n-player game where n
players interact and each of them is interested in minimizing its loss. Among the numerous
learning models that fit in this framework, the generative adversarial network (GAN) training
can be cast as a game between two players called generator and discriminator. We provide a
more formal definition of a game below.
Definition 3.1. A n-player game is given by a set of n players with parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈
Θ ⊂ Rd where for each i, θi is the parameter of player i. Each player has a loss `i : Θ→ R.
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We assume that the parameter space Θ is compact, convex and non-empty. Therefore, it has a
diameter Ω defined as Ω = maxu,z∈Θ ‖u− z‖2. Additionally, we make two other assumptions on
the structure of the game. First, regarding the players losses, we assume that they are convex.
Assumption 3.2. A n-player game is convex if each player’s loss `i(θ
i, θ−i) is convex in its
parameter θi and concave in θ−i, where θ−i contains all other players’ parameters. Moreover,∑n
i=1 `i(θ) is convex in θ.
Secondly, we assume that for each i, each player’s parameter θi belongs to a compact convex set
Θi that is independent of the others. More formally, it amounts to decomposing the parameter
space Θ as a Cartesian product.
Assumption 3.3. The parameters space Θ admits a Cartesian product decomposition i.e. Θ =
Θ1 × · · · ×Θn where θi ∈ Θi ⊂ Rdi and
∑n
i=1 di = d.
One example of convex game that satisfies Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 is rock-paper-scissors. The
players losses are `1(x, y) = −`2(x, y) = x>Ay where A is the payoff matrix and x and y are
the strategies of player 1 and 2. Remark that the losses satisfy Assumption 3.2. Moreover, the
parameters x and y belong to the probability simplex in R3.
As it is common in machine learning, we assume that the losses are estimated from data and
can be written as an empirical mean
`i =
1
m
m∑
j=1
φi(·, ξj), (3.1)
where φi(·, ξj) represents the loss associated to the sample j for player i. This sum is an
empirical approximation of the population risk E[`(·, ξ)] where ξ is a random variable encoding
the randomness of the data. For example, in the case of GANs training, the losses of the
discriminator and the generator take the form of (3.1) since we train both architectures on
finite datasets of images.
In what follows, we write the derivative of loss k with respect to variable θi as ∇i`k = ∇θi`k for
any i, k. We define the simultaneous (sub)gradient of the game to be
F := (∇1`1, . . . ,∇n`n)> ∈ Rd. (3.2)
It corresponds to the concatenation of the (sub)gradients of each player’s loss with respect to
its parameter.
While the standard solution concept when we optimize a single objective function (a game with
n = 1) is the minimum, one natural notion of equilibrium for arbitrary n corresponds to the
Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 3.4. A point θ? ∈ Rd is a Nash equilibrium if, for all i, `i(θi, θ−i? ) ≥ `i(θ?) for all
θi ∈ Θi. Intuitively, the Nash equilibrium is a point where no player can benefit by changing
his strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged.
To our knowledge, little is known about the existence of (pure) Nash equilibria for non-convex
games (see [50] and references therein for some results). Fortunately, finding a Nash equilibrium
in a convex n-player game is related to solving the variational inequality.
Definition 3.5. Given Θ ⊆ Rd compact convex and F : Θ → Rd, the variational inequality
(VI) in strong form is:
find θ? ∈ Θ such that F (θ?)>(θ − θ?) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.3)
The set of solutions to the VI is non-empty and compact when the operator F is monotone [25].
Definition 3.6 (From [25]). An operator F : Θ → Rd is monotone if ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, 〈F (θ) −
F (θ′), θ − θ′〉 ≥ 0.
For convex n-player games (Assumption 3.2), the simultaneous (sub)gradient F is a monotone
operator. Moreover, the set of solutions to the VI coincides with the set of Nash equilibria
and solving the VI is therefore sufficient to find Nash equilibria [25, 26]. The intuition behind
this result is that equation (3.3) corresponds to the first-order necessary optimality condition
applied to the losses of players.
The quantity that is used in the literature to quantify the inaccuracy of a solution θ in prob-
lem (3.3) is the dual VI gap defined as ErrVI(θ) = maxu∈Θ〈F (u), θ−u〉. However, in the specific
case of convex games, the functional Nash error is the usual performance measure. It is defined
as
ErrN (θ) =
n∑
i=1
[
`i(θ)− min
z∈Θi
`i(z, θ
−i)
]
. (3.4)
Intuitively, this sum over the players quantifies the loss incurred by a players when deviating
from his choice given that other players stick to their choices. In Section 3.4, we provide bounds
for the Nash error measure. However, they also bound the dual VI gap (see Lemmas B.3 and
B.4 and in Appendix).
The two standard methods known to solve (3.3) are gradient descent with averaging [28] and
the extra-gradient method [8]. There are some results for the former under Assumption 3.2,
but in the general case it is shown to fail even in very simple settings – see [5, 24] for examples.
The cause of failure is that the players do not extrapolate the behavior of others. The latter is
the basis for the methods of this paper. It has been extensively analyzed under several settings
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(see Section 3.2). In particular, [10] provides convergence results in the batch case and [11] in
the case of noisy gradients.
Extra-gradient consists in two steps: first, computing an extrapolated point and then using this
point for performing a gradient step:
Compute extrapolated point: θτ+1/2 = PΘ[θτ − γτF (θτ )],
Make a gradient step: θτ+1 = PΘ[θτ − γτF (θτ+1/2)],
(3.5)
where PΘ[·] is the proximal mapping and corresponds to the projection onto the constraint set
Θ. In large-scale systems, this algorithm may be computationally expensive due to the high
number of gradient computations. To alleviate this issue, we present algorithms that involve
fewer players gradients estimations.
3.3.2 Partial extrapolation in extra-gradient
In this subsection, we present an algorithm that performs doubly-stochastic updates (with and
without variance-reduction) in extra-gradient for convex n-player games. We proceed to its
analysis in Section 3.4.
As mentioned above, the main bottleneck of extra-gradient is the expensive computation of
gradients for all the players. While standard extra-gradient requires a full pass on both players
and data, we instead compute doubly-stochastic simultaneous gradients. This corresponds to
a simultaneous gradient that is affected by two sources of noise. First, after sampling a mini-
batch P of size k over players, only the gradients corresponding to this batch are computed.
Secondly, after sampling a mini-batch D of size l over the data-estimated functions in the finite
sum (3.1), the loss is estimated by summing up all the elements in this sample. More formally,
the doubly-stochastic simultaneous gradient F˜ is
F˜ := (F˜ (1), . . . , F˜ (n))> ∈ Rd where F˜ (i) =

n
k · 1l
∑
j∈D∇iφi(·; ξj) if i ∈ P
0di otherwise
, for i ∈ [n],
(3.6)
Remark that we add a factor n/k in equation (3.6) to ensure that the doubly-stochastic simul-
taneous gradient is an unbiased estimator of the simultaneous gradient.
To obtain faster rates in convex games with smooth losses (precised below), we compute
variance-reduced estimate of the simultaneous gradient. Variance reduction is a technique known
to accelerate convergence under smoothness assumptions in similar settings. While [41–43] ap-
ply variance reduction on the noise from the gradient estimates, we apply it to the stochasticity
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coming from the sampling over the players. Inspired by the SAGA algorithm [52], we implement
this idea in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Variance reduced estimate of the simultaneous gradient with doubly-stochastic
sampling
1: function Estimate gradient VR(θ, k, l, G)
2: Input: point θ ∈ Rd, size of mini-batch over players k ≤ n, size of mini-batch over data
3: l ≤ m, table of previous gradient estimates G ∈ Rd.
4: Sample mini-batches over players P and over data D.
5: Compute F˜ (θ) as specified in equation (3.6).
6: for i ∈ P do
7: Compute F¯ (i) ← F˜ (i)(θ)− (1− kn)G(i) and update G(i) ← F˜ (i)(θ)
8: for i /∈ P do
9: Set F¯ (i) ← G(i).
10: Return the estimate F¯ = (F¯ (1), ..., F¯ (n)), updated table G.
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The doubly-stochastic extra-gradient algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 2. The main difference
with extra-gradient (3.5) is that the gradients are estimated by the oracles either defined in
equation (3.6) or in Algorithm 1. Indeed, we can recover standard extra-gradient by setting
k = n in these oracles. Remark that both sampling over players and data are uniformly
performed.
Algorithm 2 Doubly stochastic extra-gradient.
1: Input: initial point θ0 ∈ Rd, stepsizes (γτ )τ∈[t], mini-batch size over the players k ∈ [n],
mini-batch size over the data l ∈ [m].
2: If variance-reduction, initialize G← F˜ (θ0) as in Equation (3.6) with full batch of players.
3: for τ = 0, . . . , t do
4: Compute F˜τ+1/2 evaluating the gradient estimate with variance reduction (Algorithm 1)
or without (equation (3.6)) at point θτ .
5: Extrapolation step: θτ+1/2 ← PΘ[θτ − γτ F˜τ+1/2].
6: Compute F˜τ+1 evaluating the gradient estimate with variance reduction (Algorithm 1)
or without (equation (3.6)) at point θτ+1/2.
7: Gradient step: θτ+1 ← PΘ[θτ − γτ F˜τ+1].
8: Return θˆt =
[∑t
τ=0 γτ
]−1∑t
τ=0 γτθτ .
Importance sampling. Different sampling strategies are possible in the computation of the
doubly-stochastic simultaneous gradient (3.6) and its variance-reduced version in Algorithm 1.
In particular, we consider importance sampling that consists in selecting the i-th player with a
probability depending on Gi where ‖∇i`i‖2 ≤ Gi. This has shown to improve the constants in
the rates (Section 3.4) and to lead to faster convergence numerically in some cases.
3.4 Theoretical guarantees
We state our main convergence results in this section. As announced, we derive rates for the
algorithms mentioned in subsection 3.3.2 following the analysis by [11]. In the appendices,
the results are proven for a generalized version of extra-gradient named mirror-prox (Juditsky
et al. [11])1. Nonetheless, in this section we stick to the Euclidean notation for simplicity. We
separately consider the two following assumptions:
(A) Non-smooth assumption: For each i ∈ [n], the loss `i has a bounded (sub)gradient, i.e.
supg∈∂i`i(θ) ‖g‖2 ≤ Gi for all θ ∈ Θ. In this case, we also define the quantity G =
√∑n
i=1G
2
i /n.
(B) Smooth assumption: For each i ∈ [n], the loss `i is once-differentiable and L-smooth, i.e.
‖∇i`i(θ)−∇i`i(θ′)‖2 ≤ L‖θ − θ′‖, for θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
1Mirror descent and mirror-prox are the generalizations of gradient descent and extra-gradient when the space
of parameters is only assumed to be Banach. The lack of a scalar product implies that (sub)gradients are not
defined, only (sub)differentials. These methods make use of a mirror map (see [9]) to incorporate information
from the sub(differential) into the optimization dynamics.
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The appropriate comparison between bounds is not at a fixed number of iterations, but at a
fixed number of total gradient computations.
Definition 3.7. We define c(t) as the number of gradients estimates ∇i`i computed up to
iteration t.
Since at each iteration of Algorithm 2 the gradient estimate is computed twice and it requires
k gradient estimates each time, c(t) = 2kt. Hence, t(c) = c/2k. We put the bounds in terms of
c in the statement of the theorems.
For stochastic extra-gradient (no player subsampling), the arguments from Juditsky et al. [11]
yield the following rates.
Theorem 3.8 (From [11]). If we consider a convex n-player game for which (A) holds, the rate
of convergence achieved by stochastic extra-gradient (i.e., k = n in Algorithm 2) is2
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
≤
√
8Ωn2
c
(4G2 + σ2) when for all τ ∈ [t(c)], γτ = γ =
√
4Ω
(nσ2 + 4nG2)t
.
(3.7)
Assuming (B), the rate of convergence achieved by stochastic extra-gradient is
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
≤ max
{
7ΩLn3/2
c
, 14n
√
2Ωσ2
3c
}
when γτ = γ = min
{
1√
3nL
,
√
2Ω
7tσ2
}
.
(3.8)
We state the convergence result for doubly-stochastic extra-gradient under the non-smooth
assumption (A).
Theorem 3.9. We consider a convex n-player game where Assumption (A) holds. Assume that
Algorithm 2 is run without variance reduction. In terms of the number of gradient computations
c, the rate of convergence in expectation is
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
≤ 4
√
Ωn
c
(3nG2 + k(σ2 −G2)) when we set γτ = γ =
√√√√ 2Ω
n
(
3nG2
k + σ
2 −G2
)
t
.
(3.9)
We now provide the result for the case in which the losses are differentiable and smooth (B).
2This result is not explicitly stated in [11].
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Theorem 3.10. We consider a convex n-player game where Assumption (B) holds. Assume
that we run Algorithm 2 with variance reduction. For all τ ∈ [t], set a constant stepsize
γτ = γ = min
{
γmax,
1
4
√
Ω
nσ2t
}
with γmax =
 k3/2√(
1− kn
) (
2− kn
) 112Ln2 , 1L
√
7
27n+ 12

(3.10)
Then, in terms of the number of gradient computations c, the rate of convergence in expectation
is
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
≤ max
{
8Ωk
γmaxc
, 16
√
2Ωnkσ2
c
}
. (3.11)
Remark that in Theorems 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 the stepsizes chosen are constant and they are
dependent on the total number of iterations t. We can get arbitrary precision selecting t and
tuning γ, but there is no convergence at constant stepsizes in the non-smooth or smooth noisy
cases. Looking at equations (3.8) and (3.11), there is convergence for stochastic extra-gradient
under the smooth case with σ2 = 0, both for stochastic extra-gradient and for doubly stochastic
with variance reduction.
The results from Theorem 3.8 yield the first row of Table 3.13. Bounds (3.9) and (3.11) yield
the results in the last row. From Table 3.1 we compare the theoretical performance of doubly
stochastic extra-gradient with stochastic extra-gradient.
i Under (A), Algorithm 2 performs with a similar rate to stochastic extra-gradients and the
effect of the noise bound σ2 is smaller.
ii Under (B), Algorithm 2 makes the O(1/c) term of the bound
√
n/k larger but it makes
the O(1/
√
c) noise term
√
n/k smaller. This is good in the long run, because O(1/
√
c)
dominates.
Importance sampling. Using importance sampling allows to reduce the constant G in the
non-stochastic part of the rate of convergence. Namely, we go from G to G˜ in Theorem 1 and
2. See Appendix for details.
3For simplicity, we overlook the dependency on constant factors and bound maxima by the sums of the two
terms.
Chapter 4
Planning with Arithmetic and
Geometric Attributes
4.1 Introduction
We consider an agent in a Markovian environment that is partially specified by a set of human-
defined attributes. That is, each state of the environment is mapped to one attribute through
a non-injective function. The attributes provide a useful language for communicating tasks
to the agent. For example, in a task where an agent has to navigate in a maze and collect
different items, useful attributes are the number of items collected, thus abstracting away objects
locations.
In [53] it was shown that using a (state, attribute) framework it is possible for an agent to
explore the environment and accomplish tasks at test time described by those attributes that
were never seen during training. However, in that work, most of the attributes were computed
through binary functions of the state, and the worst case complexity scaled exponentially in the
number of attributes. Avoiding such curse of dimensionality therefore requires exploiting some
underlying regularity in the space of attributes.
Many environments of interest have geometric and/or arithmetic structure. The simplest struc-
ture comes from the translation invariance of many environments with respect to its attributes:
in a navigation task where attributes correspond to floors in a building, the task of going up or
down is mostly independent of the current floor. We formulate our Simple Structured Attribute
Model based on this inductive bias by considering a finite set of attribute differences or tran-
sitions. In many environments, the task of transitioning from one attribute to another is not
only similar with respect to the attribute state, but may be regular across different transitions
in attribute space. In other words, the task of moving in direction θ or θ′ are similar if θ ≈ θ′.
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We leverage this further source of regularity inherited in the space of attribute differences in
what we call our Structured Attribute Model.
We show that equipping attributes with the appropriate geometric and arithmetic structure
brings substantial gains in sample complexity. Both Structured Attribute models can be de-
ployed under mild assumptions, and provide different tradeoffs of sample complexity and prior
structure. Whereas the Simple Structured Model is more robust to regularity assumptions on
the tasks within the attribute space, it is less sample efficient than the Structured Attribute
Model. On the other hand, our general Structured Attribute Model makes predictions of viable
transitions in attribute space that may have never been seen during training. As our experi-
ments demonstrate, in environments where attribute transitions lack enough regularity, these
predictions may introduce unstabilities that ultimately impact performance.
We demonstrate the efficiency of both Structured Attribute Models on several 2d grid-world
environments and unit-building tasks in StarCraft.
4.2 Problem Setup
We start with a Markovian Enviroment (ME) (S,A, P ), given by a state space S, an action space
A and a transition kernel S × A → S specified by the probability P (s′|a, s) to transition from
state s ∈ S to s′ ∈ S by taking action a ∈ A. Model-based approaches attempt to estimate
the transition kernel in order to perform planning. In this context, it is crucial to exploit
regularity priors: in many practical scenarios this ME is highly structured, in the sense that the
transition kernel varies smoothly with respect to specific transformations in the state/action
spaces. For example, applying a force a = ~F to an object at location ~l will likely produce
the same effect ~l′ than applying the same action to the same object at a different location:
P (~l′|~l, ~F ) ≈ P (~l′ + ~l0|~l + ~l0, ~F )
For that purpose, the ME is augmented with a structured attribute space R and a deterministic
mapping f : S → R, encoding the attributes ρ = f(s) associated to each state. This mapping
may be either given by the user, or may be regressed from a dataset of labeled pairs {(si, ρi)}i,
resulting in an estimate fˆ . Unless otherwise specified, in the following we shall write f to
denote the ground-truth state-attribute mapping. In order to leverage the regularity of the
environment, we equip the attribute space R with predefined algebraic and geometric structure.
In this work, we consider attribute spaces built as outer products of elementary groups and
monoids1, such as real numbers R, integers Z, counts N and modular arithmetic Z/(qZ). If
ρ1, ρ2 ∈ R are attributes, we will refer to ρ1 − ρ2 as an attribute difference. Our model-based
approach thus amounts to estimating the transition kernel induced in the attribute space. At
1 A monoid is a semigroup with identity element; a semigroup is a set with an associative binary operation.
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test time, the agent will be given attribute goals ρg, and its objective is to take an appropriate
sequence of actions in the original environment to reach ρg.
We consider attribute spaces R built as direct products of groups or monoids. In this work, we
consider natural arithmetic attributes N, modular arithmetic Z/(qZ), and real-valued attributes
R. We note however that our methodology can be easily extended to more exotic algebraic
and geometric structures, such as modular real-valued attributes S1, rigid motions SO(2) or
dihedral groups. Essentially, we can consider any set in which the difference of two elements is
well defined.
4.3 Related work
This work builds upon the unstructured attribute planning model from [53]. In that work, a
Markovian state space was augmented with a set of binary attributes. The attributes were
used as a means of organizing exploration and specifying target states. In that work, the agent
was built from three components: (i) a neural-net based attribute detector fˆ , which maps
states s to a set of attributes ρ, i.e. ρ = fˆ(s). (ii) a neural net-based policy pi(s, ρg) which
takes a pair of inputs: the current state s and attributes of an (intermediate) goal state ρg, and
outputs a distribution over actions. (iii) a transition table cpi(ρi, ρj) that records the empirical
probability that pi(sρi , ρj) can succeed at transiting successfully from ρi to ρj in a small number
of steps.
In this work, in addition to allowing binary attributes, we consider attributes with more algebraic
structure. In addition, in our Structured Attribute Model we augment the transition table cpi
with a parametric transition detector that takes into account the structure of the attributes.
We refer the reader to the references in [53] for a more complete review of the literature this
work is built upon; but will briefly highlight a a few especially relevant works. Because we
add further structure to the attributes, this work moves the unstructured attribute planner
closer to [54–57], which discuss MDPs that can be written in terms of objects and relations
between those objects. However, this current work still focuses on the interface between the
symbolic description of the underlying Markovian space and the actual space; and the symbolic
description in terms of attributes with algebraic structure is an approximation.
4.4 The Simple Structured Attribute Model
In this section we describe our Simple Structured Attribute Model, depicted in Figure 4.1. The
Simple Structured Attribute Model relies on the assumption that the possible attribute-changing
actions of the game are known. Attribute-changing game actions refer to those that imply a
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Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of the modules involved in the training of the Simple Structured
Attribute Model.
change in the attribute space. For example, a “pick-up” action is attribute changing (if agent
is correctly positioned), while “move left” is not attribute changing.
Given a game and an attribute space R for that game, if ρ1, ρ2 ∈ R are attributes, we denote
ρ1−ρ2 as an attribute difference. We define one-step attribute differences as attribute differences
that correspond to a single attribute-changing action in the game. The distinction is particularly
relevant for games in which the agent controls several units, such as Starcraft. In these games,
several different units might take an attribute-changing action at the same time. We distinguish
one-step attribute differences as those in which only one of these actions is taken.
The training of the model is divided in epochs, which divide themselves in batches and even
further in episodes. Each episode is a succession of steps. At every step, the transition proposal
module assigns an objective one-step attribute difference and the corresponding execution policy
is used to determine the action to take. At the end of the batch, information about the steps
and rewards is used to update the policies. Further details about each module are given below.
4.4.1 Execution Policies
All the attribute differences that are not one-step can be written as the sum of one-step at-
tribute differences, as they correspond to the concatenation of several attribute-changing actions.
Hence, we can restrict the planning path to contain only one-step attribute differences. For a
given game and attribute space there is a fixed amount of one-step attribute differences, because
the number of possible attribute-changing actions in the game is fixed and assumed to be known.
That allows us to train a different execution policy for each one-step attribute difference.
For each one-step attribute difference δρ, the execution policy piexec(δρ) is parameterized by a
neural network that takes as input the current state of the game and outputs a distribution
over the game actions set A. During training and at test time, this distribution is sampled to
determine the action to be taken by the agent. Execution policies are trained with a policy
gradient method (Generalized Advantage Estimation). During training, the transition module
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produces target one-step attribute differences. The execution policy corresponding to the target
difference δρ is used to direct the agent until δρ is completed (which yields a positive reward), a
different attribute transition takes place or a certain number of steps is reached (which yield no
reward). The rewards, states and actions are stored in the batch corresponding to δρ and used
to compute the update for the the policy piexec(δρ). The rewards, states and actions collected
for a target one-step attribute difference are not used to train the policies corresponding to the
other one-step attribute differences.
4.4.2 Inference
For each test episode, an attribute is given as the goal. The path of one-step attribute differences
to be followed by the agent can be computed with a breadth-first search using a queue. If the
agent deviates from the path, the path is recomputed. Every time we need to compute the
path, we initialize a queue with the attribute corresponding to the current game state. During
the search, when the attribute ρ is removed from the front of the queue does not meet the
goal, we check whether ρ→ ρ+ δρ is a possible transition for each one-step attribute difference
δρ. We add ρ + δρ to the queue for each possible transition. Since δρ is a one-step transition
vector, determining whether ρ→ ρ+δρ is possible is the same as determining whether the game
action corresponding to δρ can be taken when the game is in a state corresponding to ρ, which
follows from the rules of the game. In other words, we need to know which attribute-changing
actions are possible for a given attribute. For the games we have tried (including Starcraft) this
information is very simple and explained in Appendix C.2.
4.4.3 Transition Proposals
The transition proposal method involves a breadth-first search, starting from the attribute
corresponding to the current state of the game. In this case, the breadth-first search is stopped
at a certain depth and a target attribute is randomly chosen among the attributes seen during
the search. The list of one-step transition differences used to reach the chosen target attribute
will be used as the proposals to train the execution policies. Whenever one one-step transition
difference fails or the chosen target attribute is reached, a new list of proposals is computed.
4.5 The Structured Attribute Model
In this section we describe our Structured Attribute Model. The main differences with respect
to the Simple Model are: (i) the Transition Detector, a Neural Network that predicts whether
an unseen attribute transition will be feasible under the environment or not; and (ii) a different
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Figure 4.2: Block Diagram of the modules involved in the training of our Structured Attribute
Model. Dashed lines correspond to Memory writes, dotted lines to memory reads, and thick
lines provide labels to the Transition detector. Our model thus combines a non-parametric
component given by the memory, and a parametric Transition Detector that extends the agent
experience through the structured attribute space.
parametrization of the execution policy, which is fed as input the desired transition to be
accomplished, therefore enforcing parameter sharing across different attribute transitions. The
resulting model, depicted in Figure 4.2, contains several modules that interact with each other,
with a structure similar to the unstructured model presented in [53]. The Structured Attribute
Model does not rely on the assumption that the possible attribute-changing actions of the game
are known: it works under the same assumption as the unstructured model, which is that
we have an appropriate attribute space for our game. Hence, the Structured Model does not
distinguish one-step attribute differences. The training of this model is analogous to the one for
the simple model. However, in this case some steps are used to train an exploration policy, and
at the end of each batch an update is done on the transition detector, the exploration policy
and the execution policy. We describe each of the modules and their interactions below. As will
be shown in the experiments, this model trades off exploration (and thus sample complexity)
with an inductive bias on the similarities across tasks corresponding to different transitions.
4.5.1 Transition Detector
The transition detector is a neural network that receives as input an attribute ρ and an attribute
difference δρ ∈ R − R, and outputs TD(ρ, δρ), the estimated likelihood that with the current
policy the transition will take place. This detector is trained in a supervised fashion by receiving
both positive and negative samples. The positive samples are fed by the exploration policy piexpl,
whereas the negative samples are produced by the execution policy piexec.
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4.5.2 Memory
The Structured Attribute Model contains two policies, detailed next: the exploration policy
and the execution policy. In each case, we record the empirical counts on which attributes
they have visited. Since the size of the attribute space grows exponentially with respect to
the number of attributes, we consider only the marginal counts. For each attribute dimension
k ≤ K, we consider empirical marginal counts pˆexeck , pˆexplk over each factor Gk of the attribute
space R. In case some attributes are continuous, we quantize them using a predefined number
of bins in order to produce the empirical counts. Finally, in order to keep track of the admissible
transitions in the full attribute space (without marginalization), we consider a memory buffer
B that contains every observed attribute difference δρ, this time without marginalization.
4.5.3 Exploration Policy
The estimation of the transition kernel starts with an exploration policy piexpl that looks for for
transitions ρi → ρj in the attribute space. This policy is parameterized by a neural network
that takes as input the pair (si, ρi = f(si)) and outputs a distribution over A, which is then
sampled to determine the action to be taken. The network is trained with policy gradient
and its rewards are determined from the empirical marginal counts pˆexpl. The reward for a
transition ρi → ρj with δρ = ρj − ρi is Rexp = −α1 log TD(ρi, δρ) + α2g(ρi, ρj) , TD(ρi, δρ) is
the estimated probability that the transition will take place, which means that the first term
rewards transitions that had been assigned low probability. The function g(ρi, ρj) is inversely
proportional to the times the exploration has previously seen this transition, estimated with
the marginals of each component: g(ρi, ρj) := mink≤K 1(ρj [k] 6= ρi[k])(pexplk (ρj [k]))−0.5 . The
weighting hyper-parameters α1, α2 are adjustable to each environment and are reported in the
experimental section.
4.5.4 Execution Policy
The execution policy piexec takes as input the current state-attribute pair (s, ρ = f(s)) as well as
a target attribute difference δρ (which may or may not have been seen before) provided by the
Transition Proposal module, and outputs a distribution over the actions A. It is trained with
Generalized Advantage Estimation in the same way as the execution policies for the Simple
Structured Attribute Model. The difference is that in this case there is one network for all
target attribute difference, which is why the target attribute difference must be included in the
input.
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4.5.5 Transition Proposals
When proposing transitions, we want to accomplish two objectives: (i) enforce that the coverage
of the execution policy piexec matches that of the exploration piexpl, and (ii) provide the Transition
Detector with negative samples, i.e. transitions that are not admissible in the environment. We
propose to sample the target transitions δρ from the current buffer B of recorded transitions
as follows. First, we filter out the transitions δρ ∈ B that are considered unlikely to exist
according to the current Transition detector using a threshold TD(ρ, b) <  (we pick  = 0.1 in
all experiments); call B+ the remaining transitions. Then we consider a mixture that samples
uniformly at random within B+ with probability s0, and according to the following distribution
with probability 1−s0: ∀ δρ ∈ B+ , p(δρ|ρ) = γ(δρ)∑
b∈B+ γ(δρ)
, where γ(δρ) =
mink pˆ
expl
k ((ρ+δρ)[k])
1+mink pˆ
exec
k ((ρ+δρ)[k])
.
In words, we look at the differences in marginal counts between pˆexplk and pˆ
exec
k across the recorded
transitions in the buffer, and sample more often those where exploration outpaces execution.
4.5.6 Inference
Our inference strategy at test time is analogous to the unstructured attribute work [53], ex-
cept that our estimated probabilities to realize each transition are given by the Transition
Detector. Specifically, we look for the path (ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρK) from the start ρ0 = f(s) to our
goal g = ρK that minimizes the distance defined by the Transition Detector as: d(ρ0, ρK) =
−∑K−1i=0 log(TD(ρi, ρi+1 − ρi)) To do this we use Dijkstra’s algorithm on the graph that starts
at the point where the agent is and extends to other points in the attribute space by applying
the transitions in the buffer, giving each Transition (p, q) the cost − log(TD(p, q − p)).
4.6 Experiments
We report experiments on Grid-World games using the Mazebase environments [58] and on
Starcraft.
The Grid-World games consist of 2D maps that vary dynamically at each episode, of size between
7 and 10 in each dimension, with a single agent that interacts with the environment. In Grid-
World games, we train our structured model without access to the test-time tasks during a
prespecified number of episodes. After training, given a target task, we perform planning using
Djikstra as explained in Section 4.5.6. For simplicity, we assume the state-to-attribute mapping
ρ = f(s) is known in our reported experiments. We consider two baselines: (i) A reinforcement
learning agent parameterized with the same neural network architecture as our execution policy,
taking the state and goal attribute as inputs, trained using a curriculum that starts from nearby
tasks and extends them to the evaluation goals, and (ii) the Unstructured Attribute Planner
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Modular Switches Exchangeable Attr Constrained Attr
RL+curriculum 13.6% 14% 0.2%
Unstructured Attribute Model 9.6% 88% 20.8%
Simple Structured Attribute Model 94.9% 92.4% 40.1%
Structured Attribute Model 89.3% 93% 81.6%
Table 4.1: Percentage of proposed tasks that have been successfully accomplished using a fixed
budget of allowed steps on three different Grid-World Environments. We consider a budget of
150 steps for all models. In the RL setting, we train the model on the same conditions as faced
during testing. In the attribute setting, all the training is agnostic to the tasks proposed at
test-time. Each test performance shown is computed as the average of four independent runs.
from [53], in which we treat attributes as a set. When the environment contains continuous
attributes, we round them to the nearest integer and use the resulting discrete space.
4.6.1 Modular Switches
The first environment consists in 2-d mazes containing a variety of different objects that are
randomly placed Depending on the state of a switch, the agent is allowed to pick objects of a
specific kind, as illustrated in Figure C.1 in Appendix C.2. For each object type, we consider
two attributes: how many objects are still available in the map, and how many objects the
agent already collected. The attribute space is thus modeled with R = N× . . .N︸ ︷︷ ︸
2q times
×(Z/qZ) ,
where q corresponds to the number of different objects. The last term Z/qZ corresponds to
the state of the switch. We consider q = 3 in our experiment. This environment is highly
structured: denoting by (a; b) an attribute with a number of items a and switch state b, the
only admissible transitions are of the form δρ = (ej ; 0) with ej [j] = 1, ej [j + q] = −1, j ≤ q,
and δρ = (0; 1). The evaluation tasks consist in requesting a specific number of items of each
category ρtarget = (n1, . . . , nq). The RL version is trained with a curriculum that grows the
distance (induced by the transitions in the attribute space) between the start and the end of
the task, from 1 to 15. In this environment, Table 4.1 shows that neither the curriculum RL
agent nor the Unstructured Attribute Planner model are able to successfully complete the target
goals. The number of transitions is large relative to the number of steps. RL trained for 50M
steps. Our two models as well as the Unstructured Attribute Model are trained for 25M steps
for exploration and 25M steps for execution (only execution training for the Simple Model).
Figure C.2 in Appendix C.2 displays the positive (resp. negative) transitions discovered by
piexpl (resp. piexec) as training progresses for the Structured Model. Our models are able to
quickly generalize the transition kernels of the environment to unseen regions, by leveraging its
rich arithmetic structure.
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4.6.2 Exchangeable Attributes
This environment contains objects of several types, and for each type we consider two attributes:
how many objects are still in the map, and how many objects the agent has already collected.
At any time, the agent has the possibility to trade objects using pre-specified exchange rates, as
shown in Figure C.1 in Appendix C.2. The attributes of this environment can be modeled as R =
N× . . .N︸ ︷︷ ︸
2q times
, but this time the admissible transitions create interactions between attributes. The
exchange rates ei,j and fi,j determine transitions of the form (ρ[i], ρ[j]) 7→ (ρ[i]−ei,j , ρ[j]+fi,j),
for i, j = 1 . . . q. Inspired by real markets, we set ei,j > fi,j for all pairs. The evaluation tasks
consist in obtaining a predefined number of items of each type. We consider as before the case
q = 3. The RL with curriculum is trained in 40M steps. Our model trained in 20M steps
for exploration and 20M steps to train the policy. Similarly as before, the RL curriculum is
implemented by growing the distance (induced by the transitions in the attribute space) between
the start and the end of the task, from 1 to 30. In this case, Table 4.1 shows that, while our
Structured and Simple Structured Models still outperform the two baselines, the difference is
less dramatic than in other environments. We attribute this to the fact that the transition kernel
is more homogeneous and faster mixing than before, and therefore although the exploration in
the unstructured attributes misses many transitions, the planning phase manages to cover the
attribute space more efficiently than in the modular switch environment.
4.6.3 Constrained Attributes
We consider an environment with continuous attribute components. Here, an agent is deployed
in a terrain and it collects minerals with a single-use hammer. Each time the hammer is used,
the agent receives a random amount of mineral coming from a continuous distribution over R+.
The agent can go to the hardware store and obtain a new hammer in order to keep mining.
He can also go to the dump yard and throw away a fixed amount of mineral. In that case,
the attribute space is modeled as R = R× . . .R︸ ︷︷ ︸
q times
×N , where q is the number of different types
minerals and each copy of R are is the amount of mineral of each type that the agent has. The
admissible transitions are of the form v = (−ej ; 0) (throwing mineral j to the dump yard) or
v = (Cej ;−1) (mining at the mine for mineral j), where C ∼ Unif, or v = (0; +1) (getting a
new hammer). In order to make planning more challenging, we require that ρi+1 ∈ R′, where
R′ is a subset of the attribute space R that is fixed over all runs. Figure C.3 in Appendix C.2
illustrates the attribute space R and the subset R′.
In this case when building the RL curriculum, the first stage are goals with high probability of
being at just one transition away from the start, and next stages are defined by the Euclidean
distance in the attribute space between the start and the end of the task. As with other
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environments, at test-time the goals are to reach a certain point in attribute space. Since
being close to the boundary reduces the probability of executing a transition, good plans in this
environment need to traverse the attribute space while consistently staying inside of S.
Table 4.1 shows that both our Structured Attribute Model is able to leverage the geometric
structure of the environment to significantly outperform both RL and unstructured attribute
baselines. The Simple Structured Attribute Model performs better than the two baselines, but
much worse than the Structured Model. The reason is that the path planning method in the
Simple Model is does not learn to stay inside of S. We have tried using the Simple Structured
Model with the path inference from the Structured Model (that is, training a transition network
and using Dijkstra for planning but keeping a different execution network for each one-step
attribute difference). In that case we obtain a test performance of 86.5%, which is higher than
with the Structured Model. This increase is due to the better performance of the execution
policies.
4.6.4 Starcraft
For the Starcraft experiments, we have used the same setup as in [53], which we will con-
sider the baseline. We have used ”StarCraft: Brood War” [59] and we consider the space
of tasks of building particular units in a fixed time of 500 steps. We have restricted the
game to the Terran race and only allow construction of certain units. Specifically, the agent
can mine ore and build SCVs, supply depots, barracks, and marines. The attributes used
are the amount of ore and the number of units of each type. For the case of Barracks, we
have one component which indicates the number of Barracks currently under construction
and another component indicating how many are finished. Thus, attributes for Starcraft are
(Nore, NSCV, Nbuilt Barracks, Nmarine, Ndepot, Nunfinished Barracks). The attribute space is modeled
as R = N× N× N× N× N× N. Unlike in [53], we use the full ore counts because we can deal
with a bigger set of attributes.
The test tasks are the sames as in [53]. They are specified by attributes for which each component
is randomly in the following way: the number of Marines is chosen between 0 and 4 with equal
probability, the number of Barracks is chosen between 0 and 3 (unless the number of Marines is
larger than 1, in which we choose between 1 and 3) and the number of Supply Depot is chosen
between 0 and 3.
The Structured Attribute Model does not perform well for Starcraft. The average test perfor-
mance remains below 5% indefinitely.
The Simple Structured Attribute Model does perform well for Starcraft, as shown in 4.3. After
7.5M steps, the average test success rate for 6 independent runs is 39.0%, although it has been
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consistently over 40% and even over 50% at some epochs. That is, the agent was able to complete
39.0% of all proposed test goals. In comparison, the average test performance reported in [53]
with the same test goal selection was 31.7%.
Two possible reasons why the Structured Attribute Model does not work well for Starcraft:
• The execution policy is harder to train for Starcraft than for the Mazebase games, as
Starcraft is a more difficult game because that the agent must control a variable number
of units (up to 15 in our setup).
• The inference strategy at test time in the Structured Attribute Model is unstable for
Starcraft. The output of the transition network is a noisy estimate of the actual transition
probability, and it is more sample-efficient than the attribute detector from [53] but less
robust. This causes the planned paths to be unnecessarily long and usually increasing
in length as training goes on. The specific reason is that mining ore is a transition
completed with very high probability, as it is the most frequently seen. Hence, Dijkstra’s
algorithm will add some unnecessary transitions of this type in order to place the ”hard”
transitions between pairs of attributes that have been arbitrarily assigned particularly
high probabilities by the transition network, even if the ”hard” transition is equally likely
between other pairs of attributes.
The Simple Structured Attribute Model addresses both issues, thus overperforming [53] while
using less samples. We trained our model for 7.5M steps, and it reached the level of success
rate of the unstructured model in 4M steps. The number of steps used in [53] was 30M (16M
for exploration and 14M for execution). Since we are using an independent execution network
for each one-step attribute difference, backpropagating samples corresponding to a given one-
step attribute difference does not affect or worsen the output of the execution policy for all
other one-step attribute differences. In the Structured Model, backpropagation of samples for
a one-step attribute difference does have an impact on the output of the network for all the
other simple attribute differences, because the parameters are shared. We have thus removed
one source of noise. We have also removed the instability coming from the path inference. The
inference strategy in the Simple Structured Attribute Model yields paths without superfluous
transitions.
4.7 Discovery of Simple Attribute Differences
The Simple Structured Attribute Model relies on the list of one-step attribute differences. We
propose a method to infer one-step transition differences. We run a certain number of steps
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Figure 4.3: Success rate (%) of the Simple Structured Attribute Model for Starcraft. The
blue line shows the average performance for 6 independent runs over 300 epochs. The light blue
intervals show the confidence intervals corresponding to the standard deviations of the 6 runs.
The red line shows the average test performance reported in [53]. One epoch contains 2500
steps for each thread (we use 10 threads), 300 epochs are 7.5M steps. For each of the runs, 100
test episodes were run every 5 epochs to compute test performance.
T using the exploration module from the Structured Attribute Model (while training the ex-
ploration policy). We store the attribute differences seen in a memory buffer B, which we
suppose contains all possible attribute differences. We want to find a minimal subset C ⊆ B
such that ∀x ∈ B, x = ∑Ni=1 nici, where ni are non-negative and ci ∈ C. In general this minimal
subset is not uniquely defined. For example, for the set of linear combinations with non-
negative integer coefficients of (1, 0), (2, 3), (−2,−3), both the subsets {(1, 0), (2, 3), (−2,−3)}
and {(3, 3), (2, 3), (−2,−3)} fulfill the conditions. This means that an exact identification of the
set of one-step transition differences is not possible.
However, we observe one-step transition differences are expected to be seen more often than
non-one-step transition differences and we can leverage this fact. Let K be the cardinality of
the buffer B of attribute differences and v1, ..., vK the elements of B sorted decreasingly by the
number of times they have been seen during the exploration: v1 is the most seen difference.
Let {w1, ..., wK′} be the set of one-step attribute differences of the game. We make the first
assumption (i) that none of the one-step attribute differences can be expressed as a linear
combination with non-negative integer coefficients of the other attribute differences. For each i
between 1 andK, we can write vi =
∑K′
j=1 ni,jwj , although the ni,j coefficients are not necessarily
unique (because there might be integer linear combinations of the wj that are equal to 0). Our
second assumption is (ii) that {w1, ..., wK′} ⊆ {v1, ..., vK} and for all j between 1 and K ′ we
write wj = vf(j). Coefficients ni,f(j) are unique and equal to δij by assumption (i). We translate
our observation into our third assumption: (iii) that ni,j = 0, ∀i < f(j), for any choice of the
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ni,j coefficients. That is, for each one-step attribute difference wj , the most seen difference that
involves the attribute-changing action corresponding to wj is wj itself.
We use the following algorithm: (1) We initialize the set C as {v1}, (2) For i from 2 through K, if
vi cannot be expressed as a linear combination of v1, ...vi−1 with non-negative integer coefficients,
we add vi to C. The resulting set C is our guess of the set of one-step attribute differences, and
it is a correct guess under the three assumptions stated in the previous paragraph.
Proof of correctness: C contains v1, which must be equal to a one-step attribute difference wf−1(1)
because otherwise by assumption (iii) n1,j = 0 for all j, which implies v1 = 0. If vi = wf−1(i) is
a one-step attribute difference, by assumption (i) it cannot be expressed as a linear combination
of {w1, ..., wK′} \ {wf−1(i)} with non-negative integer coefficients. By assumption (iii), each
of the vectors v1, ..., vi−1 can be expressed as a linear combination of {w1, ..., wK′} \ {wf−1(i)}
with non-negative integer coefficients. Hence, vi cannot be expressed as a linear combination
of v1, ..., vi−1 with non-negative integer coefficients, which means that it will be added to C. If
vi =
∑K
j=1 ni,jwj is not a one-step attribute, then by (iii) for all j such that ni,j > 0, f(j) < i,
which means that wj ∈ v1, ..., vi−1. This implies that vi can be written as a linear combination
of v1, ..., vi−1 with non-negative integer coefficients, which means that it will not be added to C.
Over 5 independent runs of this discovery procedure in the Starcraft setup described in Sub-
section 4.6.4, it has been able to successfully identify the one-step attribute differences in all of
them in less than 10 epochs (250K steps). It is robust, as the output set C was also correct after
50 epochs for all the runs.
A desirable property of an intelligent agent is its ability to understand its environment to quickly
generalize to novel tasks and compose simpler tasks into more complex ones. If the environment
has geometric or arithmetic structure, the agent should exploit these for faster generalization.
Building on recent work that augments the environment with user-specified attributes, we show
that further equipping these attributes with the appropriate geometric and arithmetic structure
brings substantial gains in sample complexity.
Appendix A
Supplementary Material: Local
convergence
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.11
Lemma 2.10. If A ∈ Rn×n is such that ρ(A) < 1, then there exists C > 0 such that for any x0
the sequence (xk)k∈N in Rn defined as xk+1 = Axk fulfills ||xk||2 ≤ C||x0||2, ∀k ≥ 0.
Proof. Let || · ||op be the operator norm corresponding to the 2-norm. By Theorem 2.9 we know
that limk→∞Ak = 0. That means that there exists K > 0 such that ||AK ||op < 1. Every
k ∈ N can be written as k = mK + n with n between 0 and K − 1. Hence, we can write
||xk||2 = ||Akx0||2 ≤ ||Ak||op||x0||2 ≤ ||AK ||mop||A||nop||x0||2 ≤ ||A||nop||x0||2 Hence, we can choose
C = maxn∈{0:K−1} ||A||nop.
Theorem 2.11. If A ∈ Rn×n and ρ(A) < 1, the sequence (x˜k)k∈N taking values in Rn and
defined as
x˜k+1 = Ax˜k + f(x˜k)
where limx→0
f(x)
|x| = 0, there is a neighborhood U of 0 such that (x˜k)k∈N converges to 0 when
x˜0 ∈ U .
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 2.10, the fact that limk→0Ak = 0 by Theorem 2.9
implies that ∃K > 0 such that ||AK ||op < 1/2. Once we have chosen K, there exists C =
maxn∈{0:K−1} ||A||nop such that for any x0, the sequence (xk)k∈N in Rn defined as xk+1 = Axk
fulfills ||xk||2 ≤ C||x0||2, ∀k ≥ 0. We observe that C ≥ 1.
It is easy to see that x˜k = A
kx˜0 +
∑k−1
i=0 A
k−1−if(x˜i).
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Since limx→0
f(x)
||x||2 = 0, we know
∀ > 0, ∃δ > 0 st ||x||2 < δ =⇒ ||f(x)||2||x||2 < 
Let Bδ(0) be the ball of radius δ centered at 0. Let K
′ ∈ N such that for all k with 0 ≤ k ≤ K ′
and for all x˜0 ∈ B δ
2C
(0), we have x˜k ∈ Bδ(0). K ′ exists because K ′ = 0 is valid. For all k
smaller or equal than K ′ and any x˜0 ∈ B δ
2C
(0), we have
||f(x˜k)||2 < ||x˜k||2 < δ
Hence, for all k smaller or equal than K ′ + 1 and all x˜0 ∈ B δ
2C
(0),
||x˜k||2 = ||Akx˜0 +
k−1∑
i=0
Ak−1−if(x˜i)||2 ≤ ||Akx˜0||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−if(x˜i)||2
≤ ||Akx˜0||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||op||f(x˜i)||2 ≤ ||Akx˜0||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||opδ (A.1)
Now, by Lemma 2.10, ||Akx˜0||2 ≤ C||x˜0||2 < C δ2C = δ2 , where we have also used x˜0 ∈ B δ
2C
(0).
Hence,
||Akx˜0||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||opδ < δ
2
+
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||opδ
We consider the following inequality
δ
2
+
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||opδ < δ ⇐⇒ 1
2
+
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||op < 1
By choosing  > 0 small enough we can get it to hold, which allows us to state that for all k
with 0 ≤ k ≤ K ′+ 1 and all x0 ∈ B δ
2C
(0), we have x˜k ∈ Bδ(0). Of course, a choice of  specifies
a choice of δ and hence we cannot think of δ as a fixed quantity. Iterating this argument for a
finite number of times (specifically K −K ′ times, if K −K ′ is positive), we conclude that with
 small enough and with the corresponding δ, for all k with 0 ≤ k ≤ K and all x0 ∈ B δ
2C
(0), we
have x˜k ∈ Bδ(0).
If we set k = K, we can write
||x˜K || ≤ ||Akx˜0||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||opδ ≤ ||AK ||op||x˜0||2 +
K−1∑
i=0
||AK−1−i||opδ
< ||AK ||op δ
2C
+
K−1∑
i=0
||AK−1−i||opδ (A.2)
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Taking into account that ||AK ||op < 1/2, we get ||AK ||op < δ4C . We can once again choose  > 0
small enough that
||AK ||op δ
2C
+
K−1∑
i=0
||AK−1−i||opδ < δ
4C
⇐⇒ ||AK ||op 1
2C
+
K−1∑
i=0
||AK−1−i||op < 1
4C
(A.3)
When the inequality holds, we have ||x˜K || < δ4C . We can now prove by induction that keeping
the same values of  and δ, ||x˜NK || < δ2N+1C and ||x˜NK+i|| < δ2N for i between 0 and K − 1.
This will conclude the proof. We need to prove the induction step. Suppose ||x˜NK || < δ2N+1C .
||x˜N(K+1)|| = ||Akx˜NK +
k−1∑
i=0
Ak−1−if(x˜NK+i)||2 ≤ ||Akx˜NK ||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−if(x˜NK+i)||2 ≤
||Akx˜NK ||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||op||f(x˜NK+i)||2 = ||Akx˜NK ||2 +
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||op δ
2N
≤
||AK ||op||x˜NK ||2 +
K−1∑
i=0
||AK−1−i||op δ
2N
< ||AK ||op δ
2N+1C
+
K−1∑
i=0
||AK−1−i||op δ
2N
(A.4)
We have used ||f(x˜NK+i)||2 < ||x˜NK+i|| <  δ2N for all i between 0 and K − 1. We know that
||x˜NK+i|| < δ2N for all i between 0 and K−1 because we can reproduce the exact same argument
with K ′ (using variable i instead of k) and we end up with
δ
2N+1
+
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||op δ
2N
<
δ
2N
⇐⇒ 1
2
+
k−1∑
i=0
||Ak−1−i||op < 1
for all k up to K, which are exactly the same conditions that  has been chosen to satisfy.
Going back to A.4, in order to finish the proof we need to show that ||x˜N(K+1)|| < δ2N+2C , for
which suffices
||AK ||op δ
2N+1C
+
K−1∑
i=0
||AK−1−i||op δ
2N
<
δ
2N+2C
And this inequality is exactly the same one as Equation (A.3), which we have also chosen  to
satisfy.
Appendix B
Supplementary Material: Stochastic
Opponent Extrapolation
B.1 Useful lemmas
The following two lemmas are proven in [11] and will be used throughout the proofs several
times. They are stated in the same notation as Subsection ??.
Lemma B.1. Let z be a point in X , let χ, η be two points in the dual E?, let w = Pz(χ) and
r+ = Pz(η). Then
‖w − r+‖ ≤ ‖χ− η‖∗ , (B.1)
and for all u one has
D(u, r+)−D(u, z) ≤ 〈η, u− w〉+ 1
2
‖χ− η‖2∗ −
1
2
‖w − z‖2 . (B.2)
Lemma B.2. Let ξ1, ξ2, . . . be a sequence of elements of E
?. Define the sequence {yτ}∞τ=0 in
X as follows:
yτ = Pyτ−1(ξτ ), y0 ∈ Zo.
Then yτ is a measurable function of y0 and ξ1, . . . , ξτ such that:
∀u ∈ Z,
〈 t∑
τ=1
ξt, yτ−1 − u
〉
≤ D(u, y0) + 1
2
t∑
τ=1
‖ξτ‖2∗. (B.3)
The following two results are well known, but we will provide their proofs for completeness.
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Lemma B.3. Let F : E 7→ E? be a monotone operator. Let (zτ )τ∈[t] ∈ X and γτ ∈ (0,∞) for
τ between 0 and t. Let
zˆτ =
∑t
τ=0 γτzτ∑t
τ=0 γτ
(B.4)
Then,
ErrV I(zˆt) := sup
u∈Z
〈F (u), zˆt − u〉 ≤ sup
u∈Z
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1 t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (zτ ), zτ − u〉. (B.5)
Proof. By monotonicity of F ,
〈F (u), zˆt − u〉 =
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)
t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (u), zτ − u〉 ≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)
t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (zτ ), zτ − u〉. (B.6)
Lemma B.4. Let the game defined by losses `i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n be a convex n-player game. Let
(zτ )τ∈[t] ∈ × and γτ ∈ (0,∞) for τ between 0 and t. Let F : Rnd → Rnd be the simultaneous
(sub)differential. Let zˆτ as in Lemma B.3. Then,
ErrN (zˆt) := sup
u∈Z
n∑
i=1
`i(zˆt)− `i(u(i), zˆ(−i)t ) ≤ sup
u∈Z
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1 t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (zτ ), zτ − u〉. (B.7)
Proof. By the definition of convex n-player game,
n∑
i=1
`i(zˆt)− `i(u(i), zˆ(−i)t ) ≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1 t∑
τ=0
γτ
n∑
i=1
`i(zτ )− `i(u(i), z(−i)τ )
≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1 t∑
τ=0
n∑
i=1
〈γτ∇i`i(zτ ), z(i)τ − u(i)〉 =
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1 t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (zτ ), zτ − u〉. (B.8)
Lemma B.5. Let (γt)t∈N be a sequence in (0,∞) and A,B > 0. For any t ∈ N,
f(α) :=
A∑t
τ=0 αγt
+
B
∑t
τ=0(αγt)
2∑t
τ=0 αγt
(B.9)
attains its minimum for α > 0 when both terms are equal. The value at the minimum is
f(α?) = f
(√
A
B
∑t
τ=0 γ
2
t
)
=
2
√
AB
∑t
τ=0 γ
2
t∑t
τ=0 γt
(B.10)
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Proof. From the first order condition:
− 1
α2
A∑t
τ=0 γt
+
B
∑t
τ=0 γ
2
t∑t
τ=0 γt
= 0 (B.11)
and the result follows.
Lemma B.6. Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be Banach spaces. Let X = X1 ×X2 × ...×Xn. Let us define
a norm on X. If y1, ..., yn ∈ X1, ...Xn,
‖(y1, ..., yn)‖X :=
√√√√ n∑
i=1
‖yi‖2Xi (B.12)
It is known that (X, ‖ · ‖X) is a Banach space. Let X? = X?1 ×X?2 × ...×X?n be the dual of X
and denote the dual norms by ‖ · ‖X? and ‖ · ‖X?i . Then, for any a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ X?,
‖a‖2X? ≤
n∑
i=1
‖ai‖2X?i (B.13)
Proof.
‖a‖2X? = sup
y∈X
|ay|2
‖y‖2X?
= sup
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∑ni=1 aiyi∣∣∣∣2
‖y‖2X?
≤ sup
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∑ni=1 ‖ai‖X?i ‖yi‖Xi∣∣∣∣2
‖y‖2X?
≤ sup
y∈X
(∑n
i=1 ‖ai‖2X?i
) (∑n
i=1 ‖yi‖2Xi
)
‖y‖2X?
=
n∑
i=1
‖ai‖2X?i (B.14)
B.2 Mirror-prox with player stochasticity
B.2.1 Proof of convergence in the non-smooth case
Theorem B.7. Let (θˆt)t∈N given by Algorithm 3. Then,
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1(
2Ω +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τn
(
3G2
p
+ σ2
))
(B.15)
Proof. The strategy of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 and part of Theorem 1
from [11]. We look for a bound of
∑t
τ=0〈γτF (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2−u〉, which by Lemma B.4 is itself
a bound of the functional Nash error.
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Algorithm 3 Mirror-prox with player stochasticity
1: Choose stepsizes γτ > 0 for 1 ≤ τ ≤ t.
2: Choose initial value x0 ∈ Rnd.
3: for τ = 0, . . . , t do
4: Sample the random matrices Mτ ,Mτ+1/2 ∈ Rnd×nd. Each diagonal block is the identity
with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p.
5: Intermediate step: θτ+1/2 = Pθτ
(
γτ
Mτ
p Fˆ (θτ )
)
= Pθτ (γτ F˜τ+1/2).
6: Extra-gradient step: θτ+1 = Pθτ
(
γτ
Mτ+1/2
p Fˆ (θτ+1/2)
)
= Pθτ (γτ F˜τ+1)).
7: Return θˆt where
xˆt =
[
t∑
τ=0
γτ
]−1 t∑
τ=0
γτθτ+1/2.
By using Lemma B.1 with z = θτ , χ = γτ F˜τ+1/2, η = γτ F˜τ+1 (so that w = θτ+1/2 and
r+ = θτ+1), we have for any u ∈ Z
〈γτ F˜τ+1, θτ+1/2 − u〉+D(u, θτ+1)−D(u, θτ ) ≤
γ2τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2? −
1
2
‖θτ+1/2 − θτ‖2
≤ γ
2
τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2? (B.16)
When summing up from τ = 0 to τ = t in equation (B.16), we obtain:
t∑
τ=0
〈γτ F˜τ+1, θτ+1/2 − u〉 ≤ D(u, x0)−D(u, xt+1) +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2? (B.17)
Remark that we can decompose the right-hand side and obtain:
t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2 − u〉 ≤ D(u, x0)−D(u, xt+1) +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2?
+
t∑
τ=0
〈
γτ (F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1), θτ+1/2 − u
〉
= Ω +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2?
+ γτ
t∑
τ=0
〈
F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1, θτ+1/2 − yτ
〉
+ γτ
t∑
τ=0
〈
F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1, yτ − u
〉
, (B.18)
where yτ+1 = Pyτ (γτ∆τ ) with y0 = x0 and ∆τ = F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1.
Equation (B.18) is also used in [11]. We are now going to bound the expectation of each of the
right-hand side terms separately.
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We define the filtration F ′τ =
{
θ0, θ1/2, . . . , θτ
}
. For the second term on the right-hand side of
(B.18), we take the expectation of ‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2?:
E
[
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2?
]
≤ 2
(
E
[
‖F˜τ+1‖2?
]
+ E
[
‖F˜τ+1/2‖2?
])
=
2
p2
(
E
[
E
[
‖Mτ+1/2Fˆ (θτ+1/2)‖2?|Fτ
]]
+ E
[
E
[
‖Mτ Fˆ (θτ )‖2?|F ′τ
]])
Lemma B.6≤ 2
p2
n∑
i=1
(
E
[
E
[
‖M (i)τ+1/2Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?|Fτ
]]
+ E
[
E
[
‖M (i)τ Fˆ (i)(θτ )‖2?|F ′τ
]])
≤ 2
p
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ )‖2?
]
≤ 4nG
2
p
(B.19)
We define the filtration Fτ =
{
θ0, θ1/2, . . . , θτ , θτ+1/2
}
. By taking the expectation with respect
to this filtration, the third term of equation (B.18) becomes:
E
[
t∑
τ=0
E
[〈
γτ
(
I − Mτ+1/2
p
)
Fˆ (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2 − yτ
〉∣∣∣∣Fτ]
]
= E
[
t∑
τ=0
〈
γτE
[(
I − Mτ+1/2
p
) ∣∣∣∣Fτ]E [Fˆ (θτ+1/2)∣∣∣∣Fτ] , θτ+1/2 − yτ〉
]
= 0 (B.20)
By using the sequences {yτ} and {ξτ = γτ∆τ} in Lemma B.2 as in [11], we obtain:
t∑
τ=0
〈γτ∆τ , yτ − u〉 ≤ D(u, x0) +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2
‖∆τ‖2? ≤ Ω +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2? (B.21)
Supplementary Material: Stochastic Opponent Extrapolation 57
We bound the expectation of ‖F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2? using the filtration Fτ :
E
[
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2?
] Lemma B.6≤ n∑
i=1
E
[
‖F (i)(θτ+1/2)− F˜ (i)τ+1‖2?
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[∥∥∥∥F (i)(θτ+1/2)− M (i)τ+1p Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?
]
≤
n∑
i=1
2E
[∥∥∥∥
(
I − M
(i)
τ+1
p
)
Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?
]
+
n∑
i=1
2E
[∥∥∥∥F (i)(θτ+1/2)− Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)∥∥∥∥2
?
]
≤
n∑
i=1
2E
[
p
∥∥∥∥p− 1p Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?
+ (1− p)‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2nσ2
=
n∑
i=1
2
(
1− p+ (1− p)
2
p
)
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2nσ2
≤
n∑
i=1
2
1− p
p
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2nσ2 =
2nG2(1− p)
p
+ 2nσ2 =
2nG2
p
+ 2n(σ2 −G2)
(B.22)
Therefore, by taking the expectation in equation (B.18) and by using the upper bounds above,
we finally get:
E
[
sup
u∈Z
t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2 − u〉
]
≤ 2Ω +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τn
(
3G2
p
+ σ2 −G2
)
(B.23)
Lemma B.4 yields:
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1(
2Ω +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τn
(
3G2
p
+ σ2 −G2
))
(B.24)
Corollary B.8. If we set γτ = α/
√
τ for t ≥ τ ≥ 1 (and γ0 = α) and we minimize the bound
from Theorem B.7 with respect to α at a fixed time t, we get
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤
2
√
2Ωn
(
3G2
p + σ
2
)
(2 + log(t))
2
√
t− 1 ≈
√√√√2Ωn(3G2p + σ2) log(t)
t
(B.25)
If we set γτ = γ for t ≥ τ ≥ 0 and we minimize the bound from Theorem B.7 with respect to γ
at a fixed time t, we get
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤
√√√√8Ωn(3G2p + σ2 −G2)
t
(B.26)
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Proof. For Equation (B.25), we use:
1 +
t∑
τ=1
1√
τ
≥ 1 +
∫ t
τ=1
1√
τ
= 2
√
t− 1 (B.27)
2 +
t∑
τ=2
1
τ
≤ 2 +
∫ t
τ=1
1
τ
= 2 + log(t) (B.28)
We plug this on Theorem B.7 and we optimize over α using Lemma B.5. For Equation (B.26),
we just use Lemma B.5.
Remark B.9. The optimized bound with constant stepsizes decreases faster than the optimized
bound with decreasing stepsizes. Constant stepsizes can achieve an arbitrarily low value of the
bound at a certain t but do not ensure convergence. Stepsizes decreasing as 1/
√
τ do ensure
convergence.
B.2.2 Bounds in terms of the number of gradient computations (non-smooth
case)
Let us restrict ourselves to the case in which the masks Mτ ,Mτ+1/2 are chosen such that
exactly k of the n diagonal blocks are the identity and all choices are equiprobable. In this case,
p = k/n. The analysis can be carried out for other selections of Mτ ,Mτ+1/2, but this one makes
the argument particularly simple.
Let us define c(t) as the number of gradients of the form ∇i`i computed up to iteration t. Since
2k gradients are computed at each iteration of the algorithm, c(t) = 2kt. The inverse function
is t(c) = c/(2k). If we set p = k/n and we put t in terms of c, the bounds in Equations (B.25)
and (B.26) become:
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
=
√√√√2Ωn(3G2nk + σ2 −G2) log( c2k )
c
2k
=
√
4Ωn (3G2n+ k(σ2 −G2)) log( c2k )
c
(B.29)
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
=
√√√√8Ωn(3G2nk + σ2 −G2)
c
2k
= 4
√
Ωn (3G2n+ k(σ2 −G2))
c
(B.30)
B.2.3 Proof of convergence in the smooth case
The added assumption is that the gradients ∇i`i of the losses are L-Lipschitz, i.e. for all i
between 1 and n,
‖∇i`i(x)−∇i`i(y)‖? ≤ L‖x− y‖2 (B.31)
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Alternatively, we can say that losses `i are L-smooth with respect to parameters x
(i).
Theorem B.10. Let (θˆt)t∈N given by Algorithm 3. If each loss `i is L-smooth with respect to
x(i) and for all τ , γτ < 1/(L
√
3n), then
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1(
2Ω +
t∑
τ=0
13γ2τn
2
(
G2(1− p)
p
+ σ2
))
(B.32)
Equation (B.33) from the proof of Theorem B.7 becomes:
〈γτ F˜τ+1, θτ+1/2 − u〉+D(u, θτ+1)−D(u, θτ ) ≤
γ2τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2? −
1
2
‖θτ+1/2 − θτ‖22
≤ 3γ
2
τ
2
‖F˜τ+1−F (θτ+1/2)‖2?+
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ )−F˜τ+1/2‖2?+
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ+1/2)−F (θτ )‖2?−
1
2
‖θτ+1/2−θτ‖22
≤ 3γ
2
τ
2
‖F˜τ+1−F (θτ+1/2)‖2? +
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2? +
3nγ2τL
2
2
‖θτ+1/2− θτ‖2?−
1
2
‖θτ+1/2− θτ‖22
≤ 3γ
2
τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2? +
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2? (B.33)
For the last inequality we have used that γt ≤ 1/(L
√
3n). Now we use the reasoning from
Equation (B.22) to get:
E
[
‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
≤ 2nG
2(1− p)
p
+ 2nσ2 (B.34)
E
[
‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2?
]
≤ 2nG
2(1− p)
p
+ 2nσ2 (B.35)
Hence, using the equations above and Equation (B.21) we can write
E
[
sup
u∈Z
t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2 − u〉
]
≤ 2Ω +
t∑
τ=0
13γ2τn
2
(
G2(1− p)
p
+ σ2
)
(B.36)
And we use Lemma B.4 to conclude.
Corollary B.11. For all τ such that 1 ≤ τ ≤ t, set
γτ = γ = min
 1L√3n, 2
√√√√ Ω
13n
(
G2(1−p)
p + σ
2
)
t
 (B.37)
Then,
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤ max

4LΩ
√
3n
t
, 2
√√√√13Ωn(G2(1−p)p + σ2)
t
 (B.38)
Supplementary Material: Stochastic Opponent Extrapolation 60
Proof. When the minimum is achieved by the second term the inequality holds by Lemma B.5.
In the case γ = 1/(L
√
3n):
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤ 2LΩ
√
3n
t
+
(
1
L
√
3n
)2 13tn
2
(
G2(1− p)
p
+ σ2
)
≤ 4LΩ
√
3n
t
(B.39)
The second inequality holds because 1/(L
√
3n) < α?, which means that the first term is greater
than the second one.
B.2.4 Bound in terms of the number of gradient computations (smooth case)
If we write p = k/n, t(c) = c/(2k) as in Subsection B.2.2 for Equation (B.38):
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
≤ max
{
8kLΩ
√
3n
c
, 2
√
26Ω (G2n(n− k) + σ2nk)
c
}
(B.40)
B.3 Mirror-prox with player stochasticity and importance sam-
pling
Algorithm 4 Mirror-prox with player stochasticity and importance sampling
1: Choose stepsizes γτ > 0 for 1 ≤ τ ≤ t.
2: Choose initial value x0 ∈ Rnd.
3: for τ = 0, . . . , t do
4: Sample the random matrices Mτ ,Mτ+1/2 ∈ Rnd×nd. Each diagonal block i is the identity
with probability pi = npGi/
∑n
k=1Gk and 0 with probability 1− pi.
5: Define M˜τ , M˜τ+1/2 ∈ Rnd×nd dividing each diagonal block of Mτ ,Mτ+1/2 by pi.
6: Intermediate step: xτ+1/2 = Pxτ
(
γτM˜τ Fˆ (xτ )
)
= Pxτ (γτ F˜τ+1/2).
7: Extra-gradient step: xτ+1 = Pxτ
(
γτM˜τ+1/2Fˆ (xτ+1/2)
)
= Pxτ (γτ F˜τ+1)).
8: Return θˆt where
xˆt =
[
t∑
τ=0
γτ
]−1 t∑
τ=0
γτxτ+1/2.
Remark B.12. A sufficient and necessary condition for pi ≤ 1 for all i between 1 and n is
p ≤
∑n
k=1Gk
nmaxiGi
(B.41)
Theorem B.13. Let (θˆt)t∈N given by Algorithm 3. Then,
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1(
2Ω +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
(
3(
∑n
i=0Gi)
2
np
+ nσ2
))
(B.42)
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Proof. Equations (B.16), (B.17), (B.18) and (B.21) from Theorem B.7 can be applied in the
exact same form. Equation (B.20) can be modified trivially to yield the analogous result.
Defining Fτ =
{
x0, x1/2, . . . , xτ , xτ+1/2
}
, F ′τ =
{
x0, x1/2, . . . , xτ
}
as before, the analogous equa-
tion to Equation (B.19) is:
E
[
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2?
]
≤
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖F˜ (i)τ+1 − F˜ (i)τ+1/2‖2?
]
≤
n∑
i=1
2
(
E
[
‖F˜ (i)τ+1‖2?
]
+ E
[
‖F˜ (i)τ+1/2‖2?
])
=
n∑
i=1
2
p2i
(
E
[
E
[
‖M (i)τ+1/2Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)‖2?|Fτ
]]
+ E
[
E
[
‖M (i)τ Fˆ (i)(xτ )‖2?|F ′τ
]])
≤
n∑
i=1
2
pi
(
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(xτ )‖2?
])
=
n∑
i=1
2
∑n
k=1Gk
npGi
2G2i ≤
4 (
∑n
i=1Gi)
2
np
(B.43)
Equation (B.22) can be rewritten as:
E
[
‖F (xτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2?
]
≤
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖F (i)(xτ+1/2)− F˜ (i)τ+1‖2?
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[∥∥∥∥F (i)(xτ+1/2)− M (i)τ+1pi Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?
]
≤
n∑
i=1
2E
[∥∥∥∥
(
I − M
(i)
τ+1
pi
)
Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?
]
+
n∑
i=1
2E
[∥∥∥∥F (i)(xτ+1/2)− Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)∥∥∥∥2
?
]
≤
n∑
i=1
2E
[
pi
∥∥∥∥pi − 1pi Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?
+ (1− pi)‖Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2nσ2
=
n∑
i=1
2
(
1− pi + (1− pi)
2
pi
)
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(xτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2nσ2
=
n∑
i=1
2
1− pi
pi
Gi + 2nσ
2 ≤ 2
∑n
k=1Gk
npGi
G2i + 2nσ
2 ≤ 2(
∑n
i=1Gi)
2
np
+ 2nσ2 (B.44)
We conclude as in Theorem B.7.
Remark B.14. By arithmetic mean-quadratic mean inequality,
n∑
i=1
G2i ≥
(
∑n
i=1Gi)
2
n
(B.45)
That implies that the bound with importance sampling is lower or equal than the original one.
Remark B.15. Corollary B.8 and Equations (B.29) and (B.30) hold when we substitute nG2 by
(
∑n
i=1Gi)
2/n.
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B.4 Mirror prox with variance reduced player stochasticity
Algorithm 5 Mirror prox with variance reduced player stochasticity
1: Initialization:
2: Choose stepsizes γτ > 0 for 1 ≤ τ ≤ t.
3: Choose initial value x0 ∈ Rnd.
4: Set G0 = Fˆ (x0) ∈ Rnd
5:
6: Main routine:
7: for τ = 0, . . . , t do
8: Sample the random matrices Mτ ,Mτ+1/2 ∈ Rnd×nd. Each diagonal block is the identity
with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p.
9: Set F˜τ+1/2 = Gτ +
Mτ
p (Fˆ (θτ )−Gτ )
10: Set Gτ+1/2 = Gτ +Mτ (Fˆ (θτ )−Gτ )
11: Intermediate step: θτ+1/2 = Pθτ (γτ F˜τ+1/2).
12: Set F˜τ+1 = Gτ+1/2 +
Mτ+1/2
p (Fˆ (θτ+1/2)−Gτ+1/2)
13: Set Gτ+1 = Gτ+1/2 +Mτ+1/2(Fˆ (θτ+1/2)−Gτ+1/2)
14: Extra-gradient step: θτ+1 = Pθτ (γτ F˜τ+1).
15: Return θˆt where
xˆt =
[
t∑
τ=0
γτ
]−1 t∑
τ=0
γτθτ+1/2.
B.4.1 Proof
Lemma B.16. The following holds:
E
[
sup
u∈Z
t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2 − u〉
]
≤ E
[
sup
u∈Z
2D(u, θ0)−D(u, θt+1)
]
+ E
[
t∑
τ=0
2γ2τ‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2? +
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2? +
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F (θτ )‖2?
]
+ E
[
−
t∑
τ=0
1
2
‖θτ+1/2 − θτ‖22
]
(B.46)
Proof. We rewrite Equation (B.18):
〈γτ F˜τ+1, θτ+1/2 − u〉+D(u, θτ+1)−D(u, θτ ) ≤
γ2τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F˜τ+1/2‖2? −
1
2
‖θτ+1/2 − θτ‖2
≤ 3γ
2
τ
2
‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2? +
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2?
+
3γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F (θτ )‖2? −
1
2
‖θτ+1/2 − θτ‖2 (B.47)
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We rewrite Equation (B.21). We have ∆τ = F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1 and yτ = Pyτ−1(γτ ) with y0 = x0.
t∑
τ=0
〈γτ∆τ , yτ−1 − u〉 ≤ D(u, x0) +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2
‖∆τ‖2?
= D(u, x0) +
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2?. (B.48)
Using Equation (B.48) and the analog to Equation (B.20), we get the desired inequality.
The main challenge is to bound E
[∑t
τ=0 γ
2
τ‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2? + γ2τ‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2?
]
, which
we can also express as
E
[
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2? + γ2τ‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2?
]
Lemma B.6≤ E
[
t∑
τ=0
n∑
i=1
γ2τ‖F˜ (i)τ+1 − F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2? + γ2τ‖F (i)(θτ )− F˜ (i)τ+1/2‖2?
]
(B.49)
Lemma B.17. The following equalities hold:
E
[
‖F˜ (i)τ+1 − F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
=
2(1− p)
p
E
[
‖G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2σ2 (B.50)
E
[
‖F (i)(θτ )− F˜ (i)τ+1/2‖2?
]
=
2(1− p)
p
E
[
‖G(i)τ − Fˆ (i)(θτ )‖2?
]
+ 2σ2 (B.51)
Proof. Using the conditional expectation with respect to the filtration up to wτ ,
E
[
‖F˜ (i)τ+1 − F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
= 2E
∥∥∥∥G(i)τ+1/2 + M (i)τ+1/2p (Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)−G(i)τ+1/2)− Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?

+2E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)− F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
= 2E
∥∥∥∥
I − M (i)τ+1/2
p
 (G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2))∥∥∥∥2
?
+2σ2
= 2E
[
p
∥∥∥∥p− 1p (G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2))
∥∥∥∥2
?
+ (1− p)‖G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2σ2
= 2
(
1− p+ (1− p)
2
p
)
E
[
‖G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2σ2
=
2(1− p)
p
E
[
‖G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 2σ2 (B.52)
The second equality is derived analogously.
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Let us define the change of variables j = 2τ . Parametrized by j, the sequences that we are
dealing with are (M
(i)
j/2)j∈N, (G
(i)
j/2)j∈N and (θj/2)j∈N. In this scope i is a fixed integer between
1 and n.
Definition B.18. For a given j, let us define Kj as the random variable indicating the highest
k ∈ N strictly lower than j such that M (i)k/2 is the identity (and Kj = 0 if there exists no such
k).
In other words, Kj is the last step k before j at which the sequence (G
(i)
k/2)k∈N was updated
with a new value Fˆ (i)(θk/2). That is, Gj/2,i = Fˆ
(i)(θkj/2).
Remark B.19. For a given j, j−Kj is a random variable that has a geometric distribution with
parameter p and support between 1 and j, i.e., for all k such that j − 1 ≥ k ≥ 1,
P (Kj = k) = p(1− p)j−1−k (B.53)
and P (Kj = 0) = 1−
∑j−1
k=1 P (Kj = k) = (1− p)j−1.
Lemma B.20. The following inequality holds for any j ∈ N, p ∈ R such that p > 0:
(2d(j + 1)/2e − j)(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j−1p+ 2(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j
p2
≤ 2− p
p2
(B.54)
Proof. For j even, we can write
(2d(j + 1)/2e − j)(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j−1p+ 2(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j = 2(1− p)p+ 2(1− p)2 = 2(1− p)
(B.55)
For j odd,
(2d(j+ 1)/2e− j)(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j−1p+ 2(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j = p+ 1− p+ 1− p = 2− p (B.56)
Since p > 0, 2− p ≥ 2(1− p).
Lemma B.21. Let us define h : R→ R as
h(p) :=
2− p
p2
(B.57)
Assume that (γτ )τ∈N is non-increasing. Then, the following holds:
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[
‖G(i)τ − Fˆ (i)(θτ )‖2?
]
≤
2t−1∑
j=0
h(p)γ2bj/2cE
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
(B.58)
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[
‖G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
≤
2t−1∑
j=0
h(p)γ2bj/2cE
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
(B.59)
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Proof. We can write
E
[
‖G(i)τ − Fˆ (i)(θτ )‖2?
]
= E
[
‖G(i)2τ/2 − Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
]
= E
[
E
[
‖G(i)2τ/2 − Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
∣∣∣∣K2τ]]
=
2τ−1∑
k=0
P (K2τ = k)E
[
‖G(i)2τ/2 − Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
∣∣∣∣K2τ = k]
=
2τ−1∑
k=1
p(1−p)2τ−1−kE
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θk/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
]
+(1−p)2τ−1E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(x0)− Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
]
(B.60)
As seen in Equation (B.60), the point of conditioning with respect to the sigma-field generated
by K2τ is that we can write the expression for G2τ/2,i.
Now, using the rearrangement inequality,
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θk/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
]
= E
∥∥∥∥ 2τ−1∑
j=k
Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)
∥∥∥∥2
?

≤
2τ−1∑
j=k
(2τ − k)E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
(B.61)
Using Equations (B.60) and (B.61) we can now write
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[
‖G(i)τ − Fˆ (i)(θτ )‖2?
]
=
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2τ−1∑
k=1
p(1− p)2τ−1−kE
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θk/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
]
+ γ2τ (1− p)2τ−1E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(x0)− Fˆ (i)(θ2τ/2)‖2?
]
≤
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
2τ−1∑
k=1
p(1− p)2τ−1−k
2τ−1∑
j=k
(2τ − k)E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
+ γ2τ (1− p)2τ−1
2τ−1∑
j=0
2τE
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
(B.62)
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Given j between 0 and 2t − 1 the right hand side of Equation (B.62) contains the term
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖22
]
multiplied by
t∑
τ=d(j+1)/2e
γ2τ
j∑
r=1
(2τ − r)p(1− p)2τ−1−r + 2τ(1− p)2τ−1
≤ γ2bj/2c
t∑
τ=d(j+1)/2e
j∑
r=1
(2τ − r)p(1− p)2τ−1−r + 2τ(1− p)2τ−1
= γ2bj/2c
t∑
τ=d(j+1)/2e
p
j−1∑
r′=0
(1− p)2τ−1−j+r′(2τ − j + r′) + 2τ(1− p)2τ−1
≤ γ2bj/2c
t∑
τ=d(j+1)/2e
p
∞∑
r′=2τ−j
(1− p)r′−1r′
= γ2bj/2c
t∑
τ=d(j+1)/2e
p
(2τ − j)(1− p)2τ−1−jp+ (1− p)2τ−j
p2
= γ2bj/2c
t∑
τ=d(j+1)/2e
(2τ − j)(1− p)2τ−1−jp+ (1− p)2τ−j
p
≤ γ2bj/2c
∞∑
τ=2d(j+1)/2e
(τ − j)(1− p)τ−1−j +
γ2bj/2c
p
∞∑
τ=2d(j+1)/2e
(1− p)τ−j
= γ2bj/2c
∞∑
τ=2d(j+1)/2e−j
τ(1− p)τ−1 +
γ2bj/2c
p
∞∑
τ=2d(j+1)/2e−j
(1− p)τ
= γ2bj/2c
(2d(j + 1)/2e − j)(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j−1p+ 2(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j
p2
(B.63)
We have used twice that for |α| < 1
∞∑
s=q
αs−1s =
( ∞∑
s=q
αs
)′
=
(
αq
1− α
)′
=
qαq−1(1− α) + αq
(1− α)2 (B.64)
By Lemma B.20 we have
(2d(j + 1)/2e − j)(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j−1p+ 2(1− p)2d(j+1)/2e−j
p2
≤ h(p) (B.65)
Hence, from Equation (B.62) we get
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[
‖G(i)τ − Fˆ (i)(θτ )‖2?
]
≤
2t−1∑
j=0
γ2bj/2ch(p)E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
(B.66)
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Analogously to Equation (B.60):
E
[
‖G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
= E
[
‖G(i)(2τ+1)/2 − Fˆ (i)(θ(2τ+1)/2)‖2?
]
= E
[
E
[
‖G(i)(2τ+1)/2 − Fˆ (i)(θ(2τ+1)/2)‖2?
∣∣∣∣K2τ+1]]
=
2τ∑
k=0
P (K2τ+1 = k)E
[
‖G(i)(2τ+1)/2 − Fˆ (i)(θ(2τ+1)/2)‖2?
∣∣∣∣K2τ+1 = k]
=
2τ∑
k=1
p(1−p)2τ−kE
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θk/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(2τ+1)/2)‖2?
]
+(1−p)2τE
[
‖Fˆ (i)(x0)− Fˆ (i)(θ(2τ+1)/2)‖2?
]
(B.67)
Using the same reasoning we get an inequality that is analogous to Equation (B.58):
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[
‖G(i)τ+1/2 − Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
≤
2t∑
j=0
γ2bj/2ch(p)E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
(B.68)
Lemma B.22. Assume that for all i between 1 and n, the gradients ∇i`i are L-Lipschitz.
Assume that for all τ between 0 and t, γτ ≤ γ. Let
χ(p, γ) = 1− 361− p
p
nh(p)L2γ2 (B.69)
If γ is small enough that χ(p, γ) is positive, then
E
[
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2? + γ2τ‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2?
]
≤ 16nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ +
1− p
pχ(p, γ)
(12L2 + 36L4γ2)nh(p)
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?] (B.70)
Proof. We first want to bound the terms E
[‖F (i)(θj/2)− F (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖22]. When j is even
we can make the change of variables j/2 = τ (just for simplicity in the notation) and use
smoothness. We get
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
= E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ )− Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
≤ 3E
[
‖F (i)(θτ )− F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 3E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ )− F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 3E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)− F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
≤ 3L2E [‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]+ 6σ2 (B.71)
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When j is odd, we can write j/2 = τ + 1/2. We use smoothness and the fact that the prox-
mapping is 1-Lipschitz (Lemma B.1):
E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θj/2)− Fˆ (i)(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?
]
= E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)− Fˆ (i)(θτ+1)‖2?
]
≤ 3E
[
‖F (i)(θτ+1/2)− F (i)(θτ+1)‖2?
]
+ 3E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1/2)− F (i)(θτ+1/2)‖2?
]
+ 3E
[
‖Fˆ (i)(θτ+1)− F (i)(θτ+1)‖2?
]
≤ 3L2E [‖θτ+1/2 − θτ+1‖2?]+ 6σ2
= 3L2E
[
‖Pθτ (γτ F˜τ+1/2)− Pθτ (γτ F˜τ+1)‖2?
]
+ 6σ2 ≤ 3L2γ2τE
[
‖F˜τ+1/2 − F˜τ+1‖2?
]
+ 6σ2
≤ 9L2γ2τ
(
E
[
‖F˜τ+1/2 − F (θτ )‖2?
]
+ E
[
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2?
]
+ E
[‖F (θτ )− F (θτ+1/2)‖2?])
+ 6σ2 (B.72)
Hence, from Equations (B.49), (B.52), (B.51), (B.71) and (B.72):
E
[
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ‖F˜τ+1 − F (θτ+1/2)‖2? + γ2τ‖F (θτ )− F˜τ+1/2‖2?
]
≤ 4nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ +
2(1− p)
p
n∑
i=1
2t∑
j=0
2γ2bj/2ch(p)E
[‖Fi(θj/2)− Fi(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?]
= 4nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ +
2(1− p)
p
n∑
i=1
2t∑
j=0, j even
2γ2bj/2ch(p)E
[‖Fi(θj/2)− Fi(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?]
+
2(1− p)
p
n∑
i=1
2t∑
j=0, j odd
2γ2bj/2ch(p)E
[‖Fi(θj/2)− Fi(θ(j+1)/2)‖2?]
= 4nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ +
2(1− p)
p
n∑
i=1
t∑
τ=0
2γ2τh(p)E
[‖Fi(θτ )− Fi(θτ+1/2)‖2?]
+
2(1− p)
p
n∑
i=1
t∑
τ=0
2γ2τh(p)E
[‖Fi(θτ+1/2)− Fi(θτ+1)‖2?]
≤ 16nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ +
1− p
p
t∑
τ=0
12nγ2τh(p)L
2E
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]
+
1− p
p
t∑
τ=0
36nh(p)L2γ4τ
(
E
[
‖F˜τ+1/2 − F (θτ )‖2?
]
+ E
[
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2?
])
+
1− p
p
t∑
τ=0
36nh(p)L4γ4τE
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]
≤ 16nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ +
1− p
pχ(p, γ)
(12L2 + 36L4γ2)nh(p)
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]
+ 36
1− p
p
nh(p)L2γ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
(
E
[
‖F˜τ+1/2 − F (θτ )‖2?
]
+ E
[
‖F (θτ+1/2)− F˜τ+1‖2?
])
(B.73)
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Rearranging and using χ(p, γ) > 0 yields the desired result.
Theorem B.23. Assume that for all i between 1 and n, the gradients ∇i`i are L-Lipschitz. Let
(θˆt)t∈N be defined as in Algorithm 5. Choose (γt)t∈N such that γt ≤ γ, with γ defined as
γ := min
{
p3/2√
(1− p)(2− p)
1
12L
√
n
,
1
L
√
7
27n+ 12
}
(B.74)
Then,
ErrN (θˆt) ≤
(
t∑
τ=0
γτ
)−1(
2Ω + 32nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
)
(B.75)
Proof. It is easy to see that
γ ≤ p
3/2√
(1− p)(2− p)
1
12L
√
n
⇐⇒ χ(p, γ) ≥ 3/4 > 0 (B.76)
Hence, the assumptions of Lemma B.22 are fulfilled. Starting from the result in Lemma B.16
and using Lemma B.22,
E
[
sup
u∈Z
t∑
τ=0
〈γτF (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2 − u〉
]
≤ E
[
sup
u∈Z
2D(u, θ0)−D(u, θt)
]
+ 32nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ
+ 2
1− p
pχ(p, γ)
(12L2 + 36L4γ2)nh(p)
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]
+
3nL2
2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τE
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]− 12
t∑
τ=0
E
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]
≤ 2Ω+32nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ+
(
(24L2 + 72L4γ2)nh(p)γ2
1− p
pχ(p, γ)
+
3nγ2L2
2
− 1
2
) t∑
τ=0
E
[‖θτ − θτ+1/2‖2?]
(B.77)
Recalling the definition of h(p) in Equation (B.57), the conditions χ(p, γ) ≥ 3/4 and
γ ≤ 1
L
√
7
27n+ 12
(B.78)
imply
(24L2 + 72L4γ2)nh(p)γ2
1− p
pχ(p, γ)
+
3nγ2L2
2
− 1
2
≤ 0 (B.79)
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We show this development because it is not entirely trivial:
(24L2 + 72L4γ2)n
2− p
p2
γ2
1− p
pχ(p, γ)
+
3nγ2L2
2
− 1
2
χ≥3/4
≤ (24L2+72L4γ2)n2− p
p2
γ2
4(1− p)
3p
+
3nγ2L2
2
− 1
2
=
24 + 72L2γ2
27
(1−χ(p, γ))+ 3nγ
2L2
2
− 1
2
≤ 2 + 6L
2γ2
9
+
3nγ2L2
2
− 1
2
= γ2
(9n+ 4)L2
6
− 7
18
(B.80)
Using Equation (B.79) on (B.77) yields
E
[
sup
u∈Z
t∑
τ=1
〈γτF (θτ+1/2), θτ+1/2 − u〉
]
≤ 2Ω + 32nσ2
t∑
τ=0
γ2τ (B.81)
We conclude by Lemma B.4.
Corollary B.24. Set γ as in Equation (B.74). For all τ between 1 and t, let
γτ = min
{
γ,
1
4
√
Ω
nσ2t
}
(B.82)
Then,
E
[
ErrN (θˆt)
]
≤ max
{
4Ω
γt
, 16
√
Ωnσ2
t
}
(B.83)
Proof. Same proof as Corollary B.11.
B.4.2 Bound in terms of the number of gradient computations
As in Subsections B.2.2 and B.2.4, we write p = k/n, t(c) = c/(2k) for Equation (B.83):
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
≤ max

4Ω
( kn)
3/2√
(1− k
n
)(2− k
n
)
1
12L
√
n
c
2k
,
4Ω
1
L
√
7
27n+12
c
2k
, 8
√
2Ωnkσ2
c

≤ max
{
96
√
2ΩLn2√
kc
, 8ΩkL
√
27n+ 12
7
1
c
, 16
√
2Ωnkσ2
c
}
(B.84)
For comparison, starting from Equation 26 from [11], we get (in our notation)
E
[
ErrN (θˆt(c))
]
≤ max
{
7
ΩLn3/2
c
, 14n
√
2Ωσ2
3c
}
(B.85)
Appendix C
Supplementary Material: Structured
Planning
C.1 State-Attribute Regressor and Parametrization
In the case where f is not given by the user, on can train an estimator fˆ from labeled pairs
{si, ρi}i≤I ∈ (S ×R)I , with a neural network trained with a mean-squared loss that reflects the
geometry of each target attribute coordinate. If R = G1 × . . . GK , ρ = (ρ[1], . . . , ρ[K]), and
y = (y[1], . . . , y[K]) is the output of the neural net regressor, we consider the following metric
on each Gk:
• If Gk = N, then y[k] ∈ R, `k(y[k], ρ[k]) = |y[k]− ρ[k]|2 and ˆρ[k] = dy[k]e.
• If Gk = R, then y[k] ∈ R, `k(y[k], ρ[k]) = |y[k]− ρ[k]|2 and ˆρ[k] = y[k].
• IfGk = Z/(qZ), then y[k] ∈ S1, y[k] = u‖u‖ = (sin θ, cos θ), `k(y[k], ρ[k]) = 1−〈y[k], e2piiρ[k]/q〉
and ˆρ[k] = dθq/2pie.
The loss aggregated through all attribute coordinates becomes `(y, ρ) =
∑
k≤K `k(y[k], ρ[k]).
C.2 Further Experimental Setup
C.2.1 Training specifications of the policies
For all the policies of our two models and all baselines we have used networks with two fully-
connected hidden layers. Each hidden layer has 128 units. The batch size was of 5000 steps for
the policies.
71
Supplementary Material: Structured Planning 72
Figure C.1: Diagrams of the grid environments. left: Modular, right: Exchangeable, center:
Mining
Figure C.2: Rate at which positive and negative examples are being generated by piexpl and
piexec on the three environments (left: Modular, right: Exchangeable, center: Mining)
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The execution policies in both models have been trained using Generalized Advantage Estima-
tion [60]. The expression for the gradient corresponding to a batch is:
gˆ =
1
N
N∑
n=1
∞∑
t=0
Aˆ
GAE(γ,τ)
n,t ∇θ log piθ(ant |snt )
where
Aˆ
GAE(γ,τ)
n,t =
∞∑
l=0
(γτ)lδVt+l
with δVt+l = rt+l + γV (st+l+1)− V (st+l)
We have used γ = 0.9 and τ = 1.
For the exploration policy we have used the regular policy gradient method with discounted
rewards.
C.2.2 Modular Switches
For the Simple Structured Attribute Model, the simple attribute differences we have used are:
(−1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) / picking object 1, (0,−1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) / picking object 2, (0, 0,−1, 0, 0, 1, 0) /
picking object 3, (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) / pressing the switch. For the path inference in the Simplified
Model, we have used that all the components of valid attributes are positive and that picking
object i is only possible if the last component modulo 3 is i.
We have trained the exploration policy of the Structured Attribute Model with α1 = 1 and
α2 = 0.
C.2.3 Exchangeable Attributes
In this experiment we have made the rewards of the exploration continuous in time, in the sense
that on each step we give reward not just for the transition that finishes the episode, but also
for all the transitions that come after that episode until the end of the game. This way we are
encouraging the explorer to look for trajectories that lead to late unseen attributes. This didn’t
work on the other experiments, because it stimulates the policy to do as many transitions as
possible, and it got stuck in places where one could execute a number of transitions in a row
(mostly the switch, but also the hammer store, the dump, etc).
For the Simple Structured Attribute Model, the simple attribute differences we have used are:
(−1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) / picking object 1, (0,−1, 0, 0, 1, 0) / picking object 2, (0, 0,−1, 0, 0, 1) / picking
object 3, (0, 0, 0,−3, 1, 0) / trading object 1 for object 2, (0, 0, 0, 0,−3, 2) / trading object 2 for
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Figure C.3: Subset R′ of the attributes allowed in the constrained attributes game (in blue),
shown in the attribute space (only the first two components of the attributes are depicted, as
the constraint we impose does not affect the third component). The black strips show the area
where the game starts.
object 3, (0, 0, 0, 1, 0,−2) / trading object 3 for object 1. For the path inference in the Simplified
Model, we have only used that all the components of valid attributes are positive.
We have trained the exploration policy of the Structured Attribute Model with α1 = 0 and
α2 = 1.
C.2.4 Constrained Attributes
In this game the transitions are only admissible as long as ρi+1 ∈ S. In our experiments we
have defined this subset as S = {(a1, a2, a3) ∈ R+×R+×N | 2.5 ≤ d((a1, a2), (6, 1)) ≤ 7}. This
set is illustrated in Figure C.3 as the blue zone. In the figure, the black strips show the area
where the agent starts the game.
For the Simple Structured Attribute Model, the simple attribute differences we have used are:
(3, 0,−1) and (2, 0,−1) / mining mineral 1, (0, 3,−1) and (0, 2,−1) / mining mineral 2, (0, 0, 1) /
getting a hammer, (−1, 0, 0) / throwing mineral 1, (0,−1, 0) / throwing mineral 2. Even though
the first two components of the attributes are continuous, we can use integer simple attribute
differences because we round attributes to determine if goals have been reached. For the path
inference in the Simple Model, we have only used that in valid attributes all the components
are positive.
We have trained the exploration policy of the Structured Attribute Model with α1 = 0 and
α2 = 1.
C.2.5 Starcraft
For the Simple Structured Attribute Model, the simple attribute differences we have used are:
(8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) / mining ore, (−50, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) / building SCV, (−150, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) / building
Barracks (not finished yet), (0, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1) / Barracks are finished, (−50, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) / Building
Marine, (−100, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) / Building Supply Depot. For the path inference in the Simplified
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Model, we have used that in valid attributes all the components are positive and that Marines
can only be built if at least one Barracks have been finished.
We have trained the exploration policy of the Structured Attribute Model with α1 = 0 and
α2 = 1.
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